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The Legality of Interventions of a Humanitarian Nature  
with a Special Focus on the Libyan Intervention 
Verity Louise Jessop Adams 
Abstract 
This thesis considers the legality of interventions based on humanitarian grounds, 
with especial reference to the 2011 intervention in Libya. The underlying 
principles of international law are those of sovereignty and non-intervention; thus, 
in order to defend humanitarian interventions and those made under the 
responsibility to protect, there is a much higher legal hurdle to overcome. This 
study closely examines the development of the peremptory norms of non-
intervention and sovereignty contained in United Nations Charter Article 2(4), the 
prohibition on the use of force therein, and the extent to which State practice and 
opinio juris support a conclusion that a humanitarian intervention international 
norm has developed. It is advanced that, to date, State practice does not 
demonstrate this. Rather, States have repeatedly asserted that interventions 
justified solely on humanitarian grounds violate the Article 2(4) prohibition on the 
threat and use of force and the customary principle of non-intervention. In 
addition to commenting upon interventions in the domestic affairs of other States 
in the twentieth century, the creation of the responsibility to protect, by the 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty in 2001, is 
examined. It is proposed that the resultant adoption of the doctrine at the 2005 
World Summit stripped it of its normative framework, thereby removing its ability 
to develop into an international norm.  
A critical analysis of the Libyan intervention is undertaken, focussing on NATO’s 
exceeding Resolution 1973 (2011). The thesis concludes that the Libyan 
intervention lacked legality and confirmed fears that interventions on 
humanitarian grounds were prone to abuse. The result, as evidenced in Syria, is a 
refusal by States to allow authorisation of Chapter VII measures. Accordingly, the 
paper concludes that intervention on humanitarian grounds remains illegal in 
international law and that, after Libya, an international norm is unlikely to 
develop in the foreseeable future. 
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    Chapter One: Introduction 
Introduction 
In a little over three months in 1994, over 500,000 people in Rwanda were 
slaughtered
1
 in what Weiss describes as one of the ‘worst genocides of the post-
Second World War period’.2 The Hutu-dominated Rwandan military perpetrated 
rape, killing, and torture during their attempt to eradicate the Tutsi race.
3
 
Although aware of the violence being committed and the Hutu intention to 
‘exterminate Tutsis’,4 the international community ‘stood by … as the bloodshed 
… unfolded’.5 United Nations peacekeepers were already stationed within 
Rwanda at the start of the genocide,
6
 and had indicated to the United Nations the 
extent of the Hutu plans,
7
 yet their limited numbers rendered them incapable of 
preventing the massacre. The subsequent removal of United Nations forces under 
Security Council Resolution 912 (1994) made their presence futile.
8
 Just a year 
later, in July 1995, the world watched as the Army of Republika Srpska killed 
more than 8,000 Bosniaks in the Srebrenica massacre,
9
 in a single part of the 
                                                 
1
 ‘Numbers’ in A Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story (Human Rights Watch 1999) 
<http://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1999/rwanda/Geno1-3-04.htm#P95_39230> accessed 26 
September 2013. 
2
 T Weiss, Humanitarian Intervention (Polity Press 2012) (Weiss Intervention) 94. 
3
 Approximately 70% of all Tutsis were murdered; E Harsch, ‘OAU sets inquiry into Rwanda 
genocide’ [1998] 12(1) Africa Recovery 4, 4.  
4
 G Stanton, ‘The Rwandan Genocide: Why Early Warning Failed’ [2009] 2(1) Journal of African 
Conflicts and Peace Studies 6 (Stanton), 8. 
5
 Weiss Intervention (n 2) 94. 
6
 S Chesterman, Just War or Just Peace: Humanitarian Intervention and International Law (OUP 
2001) (Chesterman Just War) 145. 
7
 Stanton (n 4), 8. 
8
 UNSC Resolution 912 (1994) (21 April 1994) UN Doc S/RES/912 (1994), [7]. 
9
 C Paul, C Clarke and B Grill, Victory has a Thousand Fathers: Sources of Success in 
Counterinsurgency (Rand Publishing 2010) 25. 
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Bosnian conflict resulting from the breakup of the Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia.
10
  
The failure of both the United Nations and the international community in general 
to prevent or halt massacres such as these stimulated calls for the creation of a 
principle – humanitarian intervention – to ensure that such events would never 
again be allowed to occur.
11
 Numerous academics have called for the creation of a 
humanitarian intervention norm,
12
 although the creation of a norm which 
promotes non-consensual intervention in a foreign State directly contradicts the 
customary principles of sovereignty and non-intervention,
13
 in addition to the 
United Nations Charter prohibition on the threat or use of force.
14
 The issue of 
whether interventions based on humanitarian grounds can be legally justified 
continues to be a prominent problem within international law. With the effects of 
the Arab Spring spreading to Libya and Syria, concerns over humanitarian crises 
have again arisen as a consequence of the use of military force by both the Libyan 
and Syrian regimes to quash public protests.
15
 Under the broad concept of the 
                                                 
10
 D Forsythe, Encyclopaedia of Human Rights: Volume 1 (OUP 2009) 145. 
11
 Chesterman Just War (n 6), 144. 
12
 A Eckert, ‘The Non-Intervention Principle and International Humanitarian Interventions’ [2001] 
7 International Legal Theory 48, 56; F Tesón, Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry into Law 
and Morality (Transnational Publishers 1997) 315; A Buchanan, ‘Reforming the International Law 
of Humanitarian Intervention’ in J Holzgrefe and R Keohane (eds), Humanitarian Intervention: 
Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas (CUP 2003) 131; R Higgins, ‘International Law and the 
Avoidance, Containment and Resolution of Disputes’ [1991] 9 Recueil des Cours de l’Académie 
de Droit International 230, 313; C Burke, An Equitable Framework for Humanitarian Intervention 
(Hart Publishing 2013) 5; D Luban, ‘Just War and Human Rights’ [1980] 9 Philosophy and Public 
Affairs 160, 162; J Moore, Law and Civil War in the Modern World (Johns Hopkins Press 1974) 
24. 
13
 Text to (n 80) in Chapter Two. 
14
 Charter of the United Nations (adopted 26 June 1945, entry into force 24 October 1945) 1 
UNTS XVI (Charter), Article 2(4). 
15
 ABC Radio, ‘Defiant Gaddafi Issues Chilling Threat’ World Today (23 February 2011) 
<http://www.abc.net.au/worldtoday/content/2011/s3146582.htm> accessed 5 September 2013; G 
Cronoghue, ‘Responsibility to Protect: Syria: The Law, Politics and Future of Humanitarian 
Intervention Post-Libya’ [2012] 3 International Humanitarian Legal Studies 124, 146. 
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responsibility to protect, and in response to worsening threats by then-President 
Muammar Gaddafi in relation to rebel forces, the Security Council authorised an 
intervention in Libya under Chapter VII.
16
 However, the resultant NATO 
intervention has spurred questions as to the validity of interventions for 
humanitarian purposes, and the legality and status of any norm relating to 
humanitarian interventions.
17
  
This thesis seeks to determine whether any international norm has developed 
which would support the legality of interventions of a humanitarian nature. Two 
possibilities exist for such a norm: the principle of humanitarian intervention; and 
the responsibility to protect doctrine. It is the proposition of this thesis that no new 
norm relating to interventions of a humanitarian nature has developed. Instead, it 
is argued that the peremptory norm Article 2(4)
18
 remains unaffected by calls for a 
right to intervene or a responsibility to protect.
19
 The principle of humanitarian 
intervention lacks both the requisite state practice and opinio juris required to 
pronounce it as having developed into custom under international law.
20
 In 
addition, the principle directly violates the express prohibition against the threat 
                                                 
16
 UNSC Resolution 1973 (2011) (17 March 2011) UN Doc S/RES/1973 (2011). 
17
 E Phillips, ‘The Libyan Intervention: Legitimacy and the Challenges of the “Responsibility to 
Protect” Doctrine’ [2012] 25 Denning Law Journal 39, 60. 
18
 J Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law (2
nd
 edn, OUP 2006) 146; L 
Hannikainen, Peremptory Norms (Jus Cogens) in International Law: Historical Development, 
Criteria, Present Status (Finnish Lawyers’ Publication Company 1988) 323; N Wheeler, Saving 
Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society (OUP 2000) 44; M Karoubi, Just or 
Unjust War?: International Law and Unilateral Use of Armed Force by States at the Turn of the 
20
th
 Century (Ashgate 2004) 108; O Schachter, ‘In Defense of International Rules on the Use of 
Force’ [1986] 53 University of Chicago Law Review 113, 129; M Schmitt, ‘Computer Network 
Attack and the Use of Force in International Law: Thoughts on a Normative Framework’ [1999] 
37 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 885, 922; B Simma, ‘NATO, the UN and the Use of 
Force: Legal Aspects’ [1999] 10 European Journal of International Law 1, 3. 
19
 Chesterman Just War (n 6), 236. 
20
 ibid 84-87. 
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and use of force as laid down in the Charter.
21
 Moreover, the responsibility to 
protect, though initially a strong framework within existing exceptions to the 
Charter’s prohibition on the use of force, has failed to develop into a norm since 
its introduction in 2001.
22
 Upon its adoption in 2005 at the World Summit, it was 
stripped of its normative framework,
23
 leaving a weak acceptance of both pre-
existing concepts of the responsibility of States to their citizens, and the 
responsibility of the international community to respond to threats to the 
maintenance of international peace and security.
24
 The 2011 intervention in Libya 
has only reinforced concerns regarding the ease with which humanitarian 
interventions can be abused. The effects of such concerns, demonstrated through 
the use of veto power in the Syrian crisis by Russia and China, show that neither 
the responsibility to protect in its most basic form was accepted; nor is it likely to 
be in the future. Accordingly, this thesis examines the legality of both the 
principle of humanitarian intervention and the responsibility to protect doctrine 
with specific regard to the Libyan intervention. 
Definition of Humanitarian Intervention 
Before examining the legality of the principle of humanitarian intervention, the 
term must be defined. While some academics aver that ‘the doctrine of 
                                                 
21
 O Schachter, ‘The Legality of Pro-Democratic Invasion’ [1984] 78 American Journal of 
International Law 645, 649. 
22
 D Berman and C Michaelson, ‘Intervention in Libya: Another Nail in the Coffin for the 
Responsibility-to-Protect?’ [2012] 14 International Community Law Review 337 (Berman and 
Michaelson), 343-344. 
23
 A Bellamy, ‘Whither the Responsibility to Protect? Humanitarian Intervention and the 2005 
World Summit’ [2006] 20 Ethics and International Affairs 142, 166. 
24
 Berman and Michaelson (n 22), 344. 
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[humanitarian intervention] is inherently vague’25 and a ‘usable general definition 
… would be extremely difficult to formulate’,26 a basic definition has emerged 
over time. In its simplest form, humanitarian intervention is, as Murphy asserts, ‘a 
threat or use of force by a State … for the purpose of protecting the nationals … 
from widespread deprivations of internationally recognised human rights’27 which 
‘shock[s] the conscience of mankind’.28 Humanitarian intervention may also 
encompass ‘non-forcible methods, namely intervention undertaken without 
military force to alleviate mass human suffering within sovereign borders’,29 such 
as ‘economic, diplomatic, or other sanctions’.30 Additionally, some scholars deem 
the term humanitarian intervention to include the use of armed force to protect or 
rescue nationals abroad.
31
  
While the purpose of this thesis is not to define precisely the term “humanitarian 
intervention”, this thesis advances that the protection of nationals abroad, a 
practice which has taken place both before and after the creation of the Charter, 
falls under the auspices of self-defence and not humanitarian intervention. 
Tsagourias notes that ‘nationals constitute the human component of a state’, thus 
‘an attack on a national is an attack on the state’ and any action taken towards 
                                                 
25
 I Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States (OUP 1963) 338. 
26
 T Franck and N Rodley ‘After Bangladesh: The Law of Humanitarian Intervention by Military 
Force’ [1973] 67 American Journal of International Law 275, 277. 
27
 S Murphy, Humanitarian Intervention: The United Nations in an Evolving World Order 
(University of Pennsylvania Press 1996) 11-12.  
28
 L Oppenheim, International Law (H Lauterpacht ed., 8
th
 edn, McKay 1952) 312. 
29
 D Scheffer, ‘Towards a Modern Doctrine of International Humanitarian Intervention’ [1992] 23 
University of Toledo Law Review 253, 266; N Krylov, ‘Humanitarian Intervention: Pros and 
Cons’ [1995] 17 Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review 365 (Krylov), 
366. 
30
 J Holzgrefe, ‘The Humanitarian Intervention Debate’ in J Holzgrefe and R Keohane (eds), 
Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas (CUP 2003) 18. 
31
 Krylov (n 29), 367; M Reisman and M McDougal, ‘Humanitarian Intervention to Protect the 
Ibos’ in R Lillich (ed.), Humanitarian Intervention and the United Nations (1973) 167. 
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securing their safety falls under the Article 51 exception to the prohibition on the 
threat or use of force.
32
 In the First Report on Diplomatic Protection in 2000, it 
was stated that ‘the threat or use of force in the exercise of diplomatic protection 
can only be justified … as self-defence’ and that ‘there [was] no suggestion that 
defence of nationals may be categorised as humanitarian intervention’.33 While 
there is an argument that the creation of Article 51 introduced a ‘complete and 
exclusive formulation of the right of self-defence’,34 Bowett35 asserts that the 
inclusion of the term ‘inherent right’36 in Article 51 maintains the pre-existing 
customary law on self-defence. This was confirmed by the International Court of 
Justice in Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua,
37
 when 
the Court noted that ‘it is hard to see how [the inherent right to self-defence] can 
be other than of a customary nature, even if its present content has been confirmed 
and influenced by the Charter’.38 The inclusion of the protection of nationals 
abroad in self-defence is further supported by State practice. For example, the 
‘Non-combatant Evacuation Operations’ adopted by a number of countries 
including the United Kingdom,
39
 United States
40
, France,
41
 and Australia
42
 all 
                                                 
32
 N Tsagourias, ‘Necessity and Use of Force: A Special Regime’ in I Dekker and E Hey (eds), 
Netherlands Yearbook of International Law Volume 41: Necessity Across International Law 
(Springer 2011) 22. 
33
 ILC, ‘First Report on Diplomatic Protection by Mr John R Dugard, Special Rapporteur’ (10 July 
18 August 2000) UN Doc A/CN.4/506, [55]. 
34
 ibid [57]. 
35
 D Bowett, Self-Defence in International Law (Praeger 1958) 184-186. 
36
 Charter (n 14), Article 51. 
37
 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States) 
(Judgment) 1986 ICJ Rep 14. 
38
 ibid 94. 
39
 Ministry of Defence, ‘Joint Doctrine Publication 3-51: Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations’ 
(2
nd
 edn, February 2013) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/142584/20130301
-jdp3_51_ed3_neo.pdf > accessed 5 August 2013, [3B7]. 
40
 Joint Chiefs of Staff, ‘Joint Publication 3-68: Noncombatant Evacuation Operations’ (December 
2010) <http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jp3-68.pdf> accessed 5 August 2013, I-3. 
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refer to the rescue of nationals as justifiable on the grounds of self-defence. Self-
defence has also been used as the justification for interventions by Israel,
43
 the 
United States,
44
 the United Kingdom,
45
 and Russia.
46
 Moreover, though the 
interventions themselves may have been criticised, as Tsagourias comments, 
‘such criticisms [often] do not concern their legal status but evolve around issues 
of proportionality or genuineness’.  
Humanitarian intervention may also be used to refer to non-forcible interventions. 
While it is accepted that sanctions, such as those implemented after the 1990 Iraqi 
invasion and annexation of Kuwait,
47
 are attempts to intervene directly in the 
internal affairs and decision of a State and can often ‘see[m] to target the poor and 
                                                                                                                                     
41
 Ministère de la Défense, ‘Doctrine interarmées DIA – 3.4.2: Les opérations d’évacuation de 
ressortissants’ (July 2009) <http://www.cicde.defense.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/DIA_3-4-2.pdf> accessed 
5 August 2013, 23. 
42
 Department of Defence, ‘Operations Series ADDP 3.10: Noncombatant Evacuation Operations’ 
(June 2011) 
<www.defence.gov.au%2Fadfwc%2FDocuments%2FDoctrineLibrary%2FADDP%2FADDP_3_1
0_Noncombatant_Evac_Ops.pdf&ei=JnELUpiTNYer0AWohIDoAg&usg=AFQjCNEncKnc5F7H
HKJb2DRaa-Fi1r9fLA&bvm=bv.50723672,d.d2k> accessed 5 August 2013, [4.35]. 
43
 UNSC Verbatim Records (9 July 1976) UN. Doc S/PV.1939 (1976), [105] – [121]. 
44
 In relation to the Panamanian intervention the Department of State justified the American 
intervention on several bases, one of which was ‘the inherent right of self-defense, as recognized 
in Article 51 of the UN Charter’, Department of State File No. P90 0018-0477/0482 cited in M 
Leich, ‘Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law’ [1990] 84 
American Journal of International Law 536, 548; upon United States intervention in Grenada, self-
defence on the basis of the protection of nationals was used as justification for the action taken, 
Hoagland, ‘US Invades Grenada’ Washington Post (Washington DC, 26 October 1983) A1. 
45
 Gray notes that during the Suez crisis in 1956 the United Kingdom justified the intervention in 
order to rescue British citizens, C Gray, International Law and the Use of Force (3
rd
 edn, OUP 
2008), 158. 
46
 Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly ‘2009 Ordinary Session: Report of Fifth Sitting 
Addendum 2’ (28 January 2009) AS (2009) CR 5 
47
 Shortly after the initial Iraqi invasion on 2
nd
 August 1990, Security Council Resolution 661 
(1990) implemented various mandatory sanctions including the halting of importing Iraqi or 
Kuwaiti products, prevention of States’ nationals being involved in the export of Iraqi or Kuwaiti 
goods, the prevention of the sale of goods from their nationals or territories to Iraq or Kuwait (or 
bodies therein) and the prevention of any commercial, economic or financial assistance to Kuwait 
or Iraq UNSC/UN Doc 661(1990). Further resolutions included greater sanctions including the 
imposition of a sea blockade UNSC/UN Doc 665(1990) and all aviation links UNSC/UN Doc 
670(1990). 
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vulnerable’,48 the purpose of this thesis is to examine the legality of the threat and 
use of force against foreign States on the basis of humanitarian intervention, and 
not the possible ramifications of collective or unilateral political decisions 
regarding either economic or diplomatic sanctions. Accordingly, within this 
thesis, humanitarian intervention will refer to non-consensual,
49
 trans-boundary 
military interventions, by a single State or group of States, which are justified on 
the basis of ending or preventing grave and widespread violations of fundamental 
human rights of individuals who are not nationals of the intervening State and for 
which the acting States have not received prior Security Council Chapter VII 
authorisation.
50
 
Structure of Thesis 
This thesis is divided into five substantive chapters, as well as introductory and 
concluding chapters. Following on from the introduction, Chapter Two addresses 
the principle of non-intervention in international law. In so doing it first examines 
the historical development of the principles of non-intervention and sovereignty 
and their development into customary international law. Having established non-
                                                 
48
 T Weiss and D Hubert, ‘Interventions after the Cold War’ in ICISS, The Responsibility to 
Protect: Research, Bibliography, Background (International Development Research Centre 2001) 
86. 
49
 Consensual use of force, that which has been requested by the legitimate government of the 
State to which the military force will be sent, does not fall under humanitarian intervention as 
consent to use of force is an exception to the Article 2(4) prohibition on the use of force and does 
not violate the sovereignty of the State; such action is often referred to as “humanitarian 
assistance”, R Jennings and A Watts (eds), Oppenheim’s International Law: Volume I (9th edn, 
Longman 1992) 435; J Rytter, ‘Humanitarian Intervention without the Security Council: From San 
Francisco to Kosovo – and Beyond’ [2001] 70 Nordic Journal of International Law 121, 122; also 
note that Gordon states ‘humanitarian intervention is usually without the consent of the target 
government’, R Gordon, ‘Humanitarian Intervention by the United Nations: Iraq, Somalia, and 
Haiti’ [1996] 31 Texas International Law Journal 43, 45. 
50
 D Richemond ‘Normativity in International Law: The Case of Unilateral Humanitarian 
Intervention’ [2003] 6 Yale Human Rights & Development Law Journal 45, 47. 
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intervention and sovereignty as peremptory norms, the chapter subsequently 
analyses the various Charter provisions relating to both sovereignty and non-
intervention and their effect on States’ conduct in international law. Thereafter, 
Chapter Two considers the purpose behind the principles of non-intervention and 
sovereignty and their importance in maintaining international peace and security. 
Chapter Three focusses on the theory of humanitarian intervention, while 
corresponding analysis of possible humanitarian interventions is conducted in 
Chapter Four. This allows the theory of humanitarian intervention to be identified 
before Chapter Four explores interventions in practice. Accordingly, in the first 
part of Chapter Three, the principles behind the creation of the concept of 
humanitarian intervention are examined. Thereafter, the chapter analyses the 
foundations upon which humanitarian intervention is grounded before reviewing 
both the moral and legal arguments used to justify humanitarian intervention as a 
legal norm in international law. Finally, the authority for humanitarian 
intervention and the lack of Security Council authorisation is assessed.  
Building directly upon the theories of humanitarian intervention, a number of 
cases is examined in Chapter Four. The first section addresses interventions 
during the period between the establishment of the United Nations (1945) and the 
end of the Cold War (1990). The second section comments upon those 
interventions that occurred during the final decade of the twentieth century. 
Within this study, interventions have been selected which have been previously 
argued to provide the necessary state practice and opinio juris for humanitarian 
intervention to become custom under international law. Chapter Four gives a brief 
background to the interventions, including the conditions under which they took 
10 
 
place, the legal justifications given, and the extent to which they have helped 
establish humanitarian intervention as custom. In so doing Chapter Four 
determines whether or not a norm of humanitarian intervention was created 
through State practice and opinio juris in the twentieth century.  
Chapter Five explores the theory and principles of the responsibility to protect. 
Accordingly, the chapter first outlines the background to the Report from the 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty in order to 
identify the context in which it was developed. Having done so, the six principles 
of the doctrine are examined to determine the scope of the responsibility to 
protect. In so doing, the second part of the chapter identifies the framework which 
the responsibility to protect proposes, before determining how such a framework 
fits into existing exception to the prohibition on the use of force. Finally, Chapter 
Five analyses the initial international reactions to the responsibility to protect, 
with an emphasis on its adoption by the General Assembly in 2005 and resultant 
use of the responsibility to protect by the Security Council. 
Chapter Six focusses on the Libyan crisis and the subsequent NATO intervention. 
Initially, the chapter provides a brief background to the Libyan crisis, outlining 
the various elements which led to the rebellion. Thereafter, Chapter Six examines 
the precursors to the intervention, studying international reactions to the violence 
within the Libyan State and Security Council action. The intervention is analysed 
in the third part of the chapter, with regard to the mandate of Resolution 1973 
(2011). Through so doing, the issue of whether or not the NATO intervention fell 
outside the mandate given by the Security Council is discussed. Finally, the 
chapter examines the effects of the Libyan intervention on any further 
11 
 
implementations of the responsibility to protect and international responses to the 
development of the responsibility to protect as a norm. This is done with specific 
reference to the current crisis in Syria. The final chapter, Chapter Seven, provides 
a summary of the thesis as a whole and provides concluding remarks on the 
legality of interventions based on humanitarian grounds.  
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            Chapter Two:Non-Intervention as a Principle of International Law 
Non-Intervention as a Principle of International Law 
Introduction 
Humanitarian intervention and the responsibility to protect both rely on the ability 
of a State to intervene in the affairs of another State on the basis of the supremacy 
of human rights.
1
 In order to find that human rights have supremacy over State 
independence and sovereignty there exists the presumption that ‘the normative 
status of sovereignty is derived from humanity’ and that ‘this humanistic principle 
is also the telos of the international legal system’ for the law ‘has thus been 
humanised’.2 It is the premise of this thesis, however, that the underlying ‘guiding 
principle’ of international law is not human rights, but one of sovereignty and 
non-intervention.
3
 International law, in serving its purpose to regulate relations 
between States,
4
 must first ‘recognise the sovereign equality of all States’.5 In 
order to do so, international law must be based upon matters which relate to the 
State and not the individual. If the underlying principles of international law are 
                                                 
1
 N Tsagourias, ‘Humanitarian Intervention and Legal Principles’ [2001] 7(1) International Legal 
Theory 83 (Tsagourias), 83. 
2
 A Peters, ‘Humanity as the A and Ω of Sovereignty’ [2009] 20(3) European Journal of 
International Law 513, 514. Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties states that 
‘a treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general 
international law’ and that a ‘peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and 
recognised by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no 
derogation is permitted’. Therefore, a treaty is unable to make sovereignty subordinate to human 
rights as sovereignty is a peremptory norm as defined in the Article and humanitarian intervention, 
as is noted in Chapters Three, Four and Five, has not developed into a ‘subsequent norm of general 
international law having the same character’. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 
23 May 1969, entry into force 27 January 1980) 1155 UNTS 331, Article 53.  
3
 Tsagourias (n 1), 83. 
4
 A Slaughter, ‘International Law in a World of Liberal States’ [1995] 6 European Journal of 
International Law 503, 504. 
5
 R Kissack, ‘What’s the Use of Arguing? European Union Strategies for the Promotion of Human 
Rights in the United Nations’ Conference Paper (April 2009) 
<http://www.unc.edu/euce/eusa2009/papers.php> accessed 10 August 2013. 
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those of sovereignty and non-intervention, then in order to defend humanitarian 
interventions and interventions under the responsibility to protect, there is a much 
higher hurdle to surpass. Therefore, as a backdrop to how the principle of non-
intervention works within the United Nations Charter, its development must be 
charted, so as to see how much of an intrinsic part of international law it has 
become. This chapter will first review the development of the non-intervention 
principle from its base origin in the legal maxim of par in parem non imperium 
habet,
6
 to its becoming the basis of peace agreements prior to the establishment of 
the United Nations. Secondly, the role of the principle of non-intervention in the 
United Nations Charter will be analysed, with a focus on how the principle 
interacts with other articles and its supremacy within the Charter. Finally, the 
chapter will consider both the rationale behind the principle of non-intervention 
and existing academic commentary to ascertain the position of the principle 
within international law. Through so doing, and in analysing the principle’s 
formation and subsequent interaction in international law, this chapter will 
determine whether non-intervention is indeed the ‘fundamental principle … on 
which the whole of international law rests’.7 
Developing a Custom: Pre-Charter Non-Intervention  
Non-intervention is the direct manifestation of the legal maxim par in parem non 
imperium habet, which advances the precept that each sovereign State should 
have an equal vote, regardless of its relative power, wealth, status, population or 
                                                 
6
 Translated into English meaning: among equals no one is superior. 
7
 Case Concerning the Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua 
v United States of America) (Merits Judgment) [1986] ICJ Rep 14 (Nicaragua) [263]. 
14 
 
military capabilities.
8
 The principle of non-intervention itself, however, can be 
argued to have its foundation in the Augsburg Peace Treaty (1555), with the 
concept of cuius regio, eius religio
9
 giving German princes the ability to 
determine freely and independently the religion of their territories without 
intervention.
10
 The same precept was used in the Treaty of Westphalia;
11
 it is this 
treaty that is most commonly recognised as the first time that the principles of 
independence and State sovereignty were laid as the foundation of the modern 
international legal era.
12
 These principles relied upon the presumption that, in 
order to maintain independence and sovereignty, States must respect the right not 
to have other States intervene in their domestic relations. Without non-
intervention, there was little to support the continued system of sovereignty and 
independence; without one, the others would fall. The importance of sovereignty 
and independence came from the need to develop a system of independent and 
equal States so as to establish a prolonged period of peace and order within 
Europe,
13
 after 30 years of war had ravaged the continent.
14
  
After the Treaties of Westphalia, the principle of non-intervention became a more 
prominent feature within States’ own international relations doctrines. The French 
Constitution of 1793 specifically provided, in Article 119, that France would 
neither interfere in the governments of other nations, nor permit other nations to 
                                                 
8
 A Conteh, ‘Sierra Leone and the Norm of Non-Intervention: Evolution and Practice’ [1995] 7 
American Journal of International and Comparative Law 166, 166. 
9
 Translated into English meaning: whose realm, his religion. 
10
 L Gross, ‘The Peace of Westphalia, 1648-1948’ [1948] 42 Americal Journal of International 
Law 20, 28. 
11
 Treaty of Westphalia 1648. 
12
 S Krasner, ‘The Hole in the Whole: Sovereignty, Shared Sovereignty, and International Law’ 
[2004] 25 Michigan Journal of International Law 1075, 1077. 
13
 F Hinsley, Sovereignty (Basic Books 1966) 126. 
14
 S Krasner, ‘Compromising Westphalia’ [1996] 20 IS 110, 115. 
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interfere in its own.
15
 Thus, not only was the precept of non-intervention advanced 
by States as that which they themselves should practise, but States also began to 
see non-intervention as a legal principle by which they, and other States, were 
obliged to abide. Non-intervention came, therefore, to be seen as an international 
norm. Subsequently, in 1823, the Monroe Doctrine was introduced in the United 
States, which required its foreign policy to maintain the independence of States 
within North and South America in an attempt to prevent further European 
colonisation of the area.
16
 The Doctrine itself stated:  
the American continents, by the free and 
independent condition which they have assumed 
and maintain, are … not to be considered as subjects 
for future colonization … the United States … 
consider[s] any attempt on their part [European 
Powers] to extend their system to any portion of this 
hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety.
17
 
Thus, since the inclusion of the principle of non-intervention into the French 
Constitution, there has been a developing international tendency to view violations 
of the principle of non-intervention as acts which States should refrain from 
undertaking. Such violations, in turn, were seen as direct attacks on international 
peace and security. This position was supported by the inclusion of Article VII of 
the Treaty of Paris 1856, which obliged all Treaty parties
18
 to ‘respect the 
Independence and the Territorial Integrity of the Ottoman Empire’.19 The inclusion 
of Article VII illustrated two concepts: that respect for sovereignty and non-
                                                 
15
 ‘Il ne s’immisce point dans le gouvernement des autres nations; il ne souffre pas que autres 
nations s’immiscent dans le sien’ Acte Constitutionnel 1791, Article 119.  
16
 G Herring, From Colony to Superpower: US Foreign Relations since 1776 (OUP 2008) 
(Herring) 153. 
17
 J Monroe, ‘The Monroe Doctrine’ (2 December 1823) 
<http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/monroe.asp> accessed 13 September 2013. 
18
 Great Britain, Austria, France, Prussia, Russia, Sardinia, and Turkey. 
19
 Treaty of Paris 1856, Article VII. 
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intervention was considered internationally as vital to the maintenance of peace; 
and that the community of States believed that international law afforded rights to 
those States considered equal.
20
 Such a shift in attitude showed that the principle 
of non-intervention had developed into a customary international norm; States 
obeyed for fear of international repercussions. Moreover, it was not solely the 
United States that actively protected the principle of non-intervention. Great 
Britain agreed with the basic premise of the Monroe Doctrine and worked in 
agreement with the United States to attempt to preserve the independence of the 
North and South American States.
21
 Over the course of the nineteenth century, the 
continual trail of interventions between Concert of Europe States began to take its 
toll. The destruction, both regional and economic, wrought by the Crimean, 
Austro-Prussian and Franco-Prussian wars left Russia weakened, Austria isolated, 
and Prussia emboldened.
22
 In the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, Europe 
recognised the need to regulate warfare and refrain from solving diplomatic 
disagreements through war with the implementation of Laws and Customs of 
War,
23
 and the introduction of the Permanent Court of Arbitration,
24
 both of which 
were aimed at the preservation of peace and prevention of armed conflicts.
25
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 P Balfour (Lord Kinross), The Ottoman Empire (Folio Society 2003) 495. 
21
 Herring (n 16), 155. 
22
 R Gildea, The Short Oxford History of the Modern World: Barricades and Borders Europe 
1800-1914 (OUP 1987) 182. 
23
 Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague II) (adopted 29 July 
1899, entered into force 4 September 1900) in D Schindler and J Toman, The Laws of Armed 
Conflict (Brill 1988) 63. 
24
 Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes (Hague I) (adopted 29 July 
1899, entered into force 4 September 1900) in ibid 54. 
25
 Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague II) (adopted 29 July 
1899, entered into force 4 September 1900) in ibid 63, Preamble; Convention for the Pacific 
Settlement of International Disputes (Hague I) (adopted 29 July 1899, entered into force 4 
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Notwithstanding the outbreak of the First World War seven years later, there was, 
finally, in the twentieth century, a cohesive movement towards an international 
recognition of the principle of non-intervention, with international agreements 
calling for States to respect the sovereignty and independence of other States by 
refraining from intervening in such States’ internal affairs. In 1928, the Kellogg-
Briand Pact
26
 created an international agreement between States to refrain from 
using war to resolve disputes or conflicts (whatever the origin of the dispute itself) 
and to settle disputes peacefully and without recourse to armed activities. Though 
the effectiveness of the Pact itself was relatively poor, and short-lived, with it 
doing little to reduce increasing militarisation or prevent the Second World War, it 
was a clear sign that the principle of non-intervention had been internationally 
accepted.
27
 While the Pact had only 54 signatories, such signatories included the 
main powers of the time with the United Kingdom, the United States, France, 
Russia, Japan, and much of Europe. This level of acceptance indicates that, by 
1929, the principle of non-intervention had become a principle which was widely 
respected as being part of international law and which had already become part of 
most countries’ domestic and foreign affairs. In the same year that the Kellogg-
Briand Pact was signed, the General Act for the Pacific Settlement of International 
Disputes [‘General Act’] was concluded. It provided a specific framework within 
which parties could settle disputes, stating in Article 1 that  
disputes of every kind between two or more 
Parties … which it has not been possible to settle 
by diplomacy shall, subject to such reservations as 
                                                 
26
 Commonly known as the Pact of Paris. 
27
 Kellogg-Briand Pact 1928 (adopted 27 August 1928, entered into force 24 July 1929) 46 USSL 
2343. 
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may be made … be submitted … to the procedure 
of conciliation.
28
  
While the General Act itself never specifically mentioned the principle of non-
intervention, it clearly set out the requirement of Parties to ensure that they did not 
intervene in other States where there evolved a dispute between States. Finally, in 
1936, at the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace, there was a 
distinct declaration of the principle of non-intervention. It was due to the 
combination of all these singular acts and treaties that the principle of non-
intervention became a solid customary international principle. The Additional 
Protocol Relative to Non-Intervention declared in its preamble that it was 
Desiring to assure the benefits of peace in their 
mutual relations and in their relations with all the 
nations of the earth and to abolish the practice of 
intervention … solemnly affirming the 
fundamental principle that no State has the right 
to intervene in the internal or external affairs of 
another.
29
 
There was therefore an unambiguous recognition both of the principle of non-
intervention and the necessity of ensuring that such a principle was protected by 
States in their own relations, and the relations of others. It is for this reason that 
Shen argues that, during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, ‘non-
intervention eventually became accepted by other major powers as a customary 
rule of international law’,30 with, from 1919, the League of Nations Covenant 
specifically providing that ‘[i]f the dispute between parties is … found by the 
Council, to arise out of a matter which by international law is solely within the 
                                                 
28
 General Act for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes (adopted 26 September 1928, 
entered into force 16 August 1929) 2123 LNTS 345. 
29
 Additional Protocol Relative to Non-Intervention (adopted 23 December 1936, entered into 
force 25 August 1937) 188 LNTS 31. 
30
 J Shen, ‘The Non-Intervention Principle and Humanitarian Interventions under International 
Law’ [2001] 7(1) International Legal Theory 1 (Shen), 2. 
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domestic jurisdiction of that party, the Council … shall make no recommendation 
as to its settlement’.31 
Non-Intervention and the Charter 
By 1945, non-intervention had been firmly established as a customary 
international principle. States had consistently adhered to the concept that 
intervention was and continued to be unlawful unless some form of pre-existing 
consent had been given.
32
 With the creation of the United Nations and the United 
Nations Charter in 1945, the principle of non-intervention was finally codified 
within several provisions. Non-intervention, in its various forms, is contained 
within Articles 2(1), 2(3), 2(4) and 2(7).  
Article 2(1): The Sovereign Equality of All Members 
Article 2(1) of the Charter ‘attributes to all States the same rights and imposes 
upon them reciprocally the same duties’ by ensuring the equality of all Member 
States.
33
 By that principle, the smallest and weakest State should ‘have the same 
capacity’ for international rights, duties and obligations as the most powerful 
State.
34
 Equality is, therefore, intrinsically related to non-intervention; States 
would be unable to exercise the same capacity to rights and duties were they 
                                                 
31
 Covenant of the League of Nations (adopted 28 June 1919, entered into force 10 January 1920) 
225 CTS 195 (League of Nations), Article 15. 
32
 Shen (n 30) 4.  
33
 E Dickinson, The Equality of States in International Law (Harvard University Press, 1920) 105. 
34
 H Kelsen, ‘The Principle of Sovereign Equality of States as a Basis for International 
Organisation’ [1944] 53(1) Yale Law Journal 207 (Kelsen), 209; it should be noted that the 
inclusion of Article 2(1) was not the first embodiment of equality as it was first enshrined in the 
Treaty of Westphalia 1648, D Hassan, ‘The Rise of the Territorial State and the Treaty of 
Westphalia’ [2006] 9 Yearbook of New Zealand Jurisprudence 62, 63. 
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subject to the intervention of other States within their domestic affairs.
35
 A single 
State must be safe from being subject to another State’s will in order to exercise 
its single equal vote adequately; thus, in order for each State to be equal, each 
State must adhere to the principle of non-intervention.
36
 Such a notion aligns with 
Oppenheim’s four rules within sovereign equality:37 all States have a right to a 
single vote;
38
 each vote must be considered equal;
39
 no State has power over 
another State;
40
 and no State has jurisdiction over another State.
41
 
The moment a State intervenes in the domestic affairs of another State, the 
intervening State presupposes that it has power over the other State. Such a 
supposition results in a hierarchy of States being created, which international law 
has refused to allow in two different ways. First, both global and regional 
organisations have continued to support the theory that each State within the 
organisation must have a single equal vote. The League of Nations,
42
 
Organization of the American States (OAS),
43
 League of Arab States (LAS),
44
 and 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)
45
 have all, for 
example, included within their Covenants or Treaties an article specifically giving 
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 Kelsen (n 34), 209. 
36
 R P Anand, ‘Sovereign Equality of States in International Law – II’ [1966] 8 International 
Studies 386, 387. 
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 ibid 386. 
38
 L Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise (H Lauterpacht ed., 8
th
 edn, McKay 1952) 
(Oppenheim Treatise) 263. 
39
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40
 G Badr, State Immunity: An Analytical and Prognostic View (Martinus Nijhoff, 1984) 89. 
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each Member State a single vote, equal to the vote of each other Member. 
Secondly, in the Sambiaggio case,
46
 Rolston did not accept the Italian claims that 
Venezuela was not privy to the protection of the international legal principle of 
the non-liability of governments for the act of revolutionary agents.
47
 Italy 
claimed that, due to the frequency with which revolutions occurred in Venezuela, 
the government could not afford itself the protection of the principle.
48
 Instead, 
Rolston noted that to do so would be to find Venezuela ‘moving on a lower 
international plane’ and that he would ‘indulge no presumption which could be 
regarded as lowering [Venezuela]… He [Rolston] was bound to assume equality 
of position and equality of right’.49 The principle of sovereign equality was further 
confirmed in the Jurisdictional Immunities of the State case, where the 
International Court of Justice asserted that ‘the principle of sovereign equality of 
States … is one of the fundamental principles of the international legal order’.50 
Given the consistent efforts made to ensure that equality is maintained between 
States, any new principle in international law would have to maintain such 
equality. However, the creation of an easily-met threshold for humanitarian 
intervention or the responsibility to protect inherently results in the creation of a 
hierarchical system in which the ideological and political beliefs of one nation are 
considered superior to that of another State. As subsequent chapters will argue, 
the imposition of force on other States under the guise of ‘humanitarian 
                                                 
46
 The case concerned the seeking of compensation for damage caused by revolutionary 
Venezuelan forces in an unsuccessful insurgency, Sambiaggio Case (Italy v Venezuela) (1903) 10 
RIAA 499. 
47
 ibid 523. 
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 ibid 502. 
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 ibid 524. 
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 Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v Italy: Greece Intervening) (Judgment) [2012] 
ICJ Rep 1, 24 [57]. 
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objectives’ enables one State to superimpose its political and ideological beliefs 
on another. 
Article 2(4): The Prohibition on the Use of Force 
The general prohibition of force lies not only against the use of force in territorial 
terms, with a State invading the territory of another, or the use of weaponry 
against the territory of another State, but also the threat or use of force against the 
political independence of a State. The definition of force however, as 
Randelzhoffer discerns, is not clearly indicated within Article 2(4).
51
 In the 
General Assembly’s Declaration on the Principles of International Law 
Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States (Declaration), force 
is referred to only in terms of military force.
52
 However, the Declaration goes on 
to note the international obligation not to intervene in matters which are 
considered to be within the domestic jurisdiction of a State.
53
 Randelzhoffer 
suggests that, by referring to the use of force only in military terms and then 
referring to an obligation of non-intervention, the Declaration delineates between 
the Article 2(4) prohibition which relates to force and the general international 
principle of non-intervention relating to interference in internal State matters.
54
 
The definition of force as ‘armed force’ is further buttressed by reference to 
Article 44 of the Charter, which also uses the term force in a manner which, as 
Virally observes, could only be interpreted as meaning armed force.
55
 The 
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 B Simma (ed.), The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary Volume I (2
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53
 ibid. 
54
 Simma Charter (n 51), [19]. 
55
 M Virally, ‘Art 2 § 4’ in JP Cot and A Pellet (eds), La Charte des Nations Unies (2nd edn, 
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Declaration also notes that ‘no State may use or encourage the use of economic 
political or any other type of measure to coerce another State’.56 Similarly, 
General Assembly Resolution 42/22 included indirect force within the Article 2(4) 
definition of force, stating that States should refrain from  
organizing, instigating, or assisting or participating 
in paramilitary, terrorist or subversive acts, 
including acts of mercenaries, in other States’ and 
have a duty to ‘abstain from armed intervention and 
all other forms of interference or attempted threats 
against the personality of the State or against its 
political, economic and cultural elements.
57
  
In Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, the 
International Court of Justice found that not all acts which could be broadly 
interpreted to be ‘encouraging’, ‘assisting’, or ‘participating’, would fall under a 
violation of the prohibition of the use of force.
58
 The Court found that the 
provision of arms and the training of contra forces was a violation of the 
prohibition of the use of force, while funding them, though an intervention in 
Nicaragua’s internal affairs, was not.59 As a consequence, there is no prohibition 
upon the use of economic sanctions, or a State’s refusal to participate in any form 
of relations with a State. This is because such actions are not specifically intended 
to interfere with the personality of the State and are simply the State exercising its 
prerogative as a sovereign State.  
                                                 
56
 UNSC 2625 (n 52). 
57
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There are three main exceptions to the general prohibition of the use of force: 
Chapter VII-authorised intervention;
60
 individual or collective self-defence under 
Article 51; and consent to intervention by the State in which the intervention will 
take place.
61
 The Article 51 exception to the use of force and the exception where 
the intervening State has obtained the consent of the State in which the 
intervention is taking place, are not relevant to this thesis. This is because both 
scenarios relate to a distinctly different set of circumstances than those pertaining 
to humanitarian intervention and the responsibility to protect. Thus, this chapter, 
and indeed thesis, focusses solely on the exception contained in Chapter VII. 
Proponents of humanitarian intervention and the responsibility to protect have 
suggested that the circumstances under which such principles would work result 
in a fourth exception.
62
 Conscious of this, the possibility of the creation of a fourth 
exception will be dealt with in Chapters Three and Five.  
Articles 41 and 42 of the Charter allow for the authorisation of various measures 
to ‘maintain or restore international peace and security’ where the Security 
Council determines ‘the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, 
or act of aggression’.63 It is the requirement of Security Council authorisation that 
allows Chapter VII to protect the basic principle of non-intervention whilst also 
protecting both the rights of other States and the rights of individuals within 
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States. Before action may be taken under Chapter VII, the Security Council must 
satisfy several requirements.  
First, the Security Council must find that there has either been a threat or breach 
to the peace, or an act of aggression.
64
 As in the case of the prohibition of the 
threat or use of force, the terms ‘threat or breach of the peace’ and ‘act of 
aggression’ are not defined within Article 39. Krisch and Frowein suggest that 
peace should be interpreted as an ‘absence of organised use of force’, as any 
broader interpretation would result in the ‘blurring [of] the contours of the 
concept’.65 Although the Security Council accepted that ‘the absence of war and 
military conflicts amongst States does not in itself ensure international peace and 
security’,66 it went on to note that instability due to economic, social, and 
ecological problems must be solved by ‘working through the appropriate 
bodies’.67 Therefore, it seems that there may only be a breach of the peace, or 
threat of breach of the peace, where armed conflict has occurred or is threatened 
to occur. Article 39 places a further hurdle, requiring that the Security Council 
will only decide to take measures where it is necessary to ‘maintain or restore 
international peace and security’.68 The inclusion of the term ‘international’ is 
important, because it has caused debate as to whether an internal armed conflict 
may constitute a breach of the peace which would require the Security Council to 
act in order to maintain or restore peace.
69
 This is because, as noted by Österdahl, 
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the original task of the Security Council was to prevent the recurrence of inter-
state wars.
70
 It can thus be assumed that Article 39 was to be used in 
circumstances of inter-state conflict given: the inclusion of ‘international’ in the 
wording of Article 39; the original purpose of the Security Council; and the fact 
that Article 2(4) does not prohibit the threat or use of force internally. However, 
Security Council practice suggests that a threat to peace is willing to be found 
where internal conflict would resultantly place the international order under threat, 
thus showing a slow development in the Security Council towards recognising the 
effects of internal conflict on the international plain.
71
 As Chesterman notes, after 
the Cold War the Security Council began to use a much wider interpretation of 
Article 39 in assessing where there was a threat to international peace.
72
 This can 
be seen in the Yugoslav War of 1991, when the Security Council determined that 
the internal fighting which was ‘causing a heavy loss of human life and material 
damage’ constituted a threat to international peace and security; accordingly it 
authorised Chapter VII action in the form of a general embargo on weapons.
73
 The 
same can be seen with regard to the crisis in Liberia in 1992, when the Security 
Council determined that the deterioration of the internal situation therein and the 
violation of the Yamoussoukro IV Peace Agreement constituted a threat to 
international peace and security, thereby implementing the first arms embargo on 
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Liberia under Chapter VII.
74
 Indeed, throughout the 1990s, the Security Council 
continued to find that internal conflicts threatened international peace and 
security. Through so doing it can be seen to have created a precedent in which the 
parameters of Article 39 were broadened.
75
 
The second requirement is that the Security Council must determine which 
measures (if any) ‘not involving the use of armed force’ would be able to give 
effect to its decision regarding the maintenance or restoration of international 
peace and security.
76
 Such a determination must be made before any Article 42 
measures are considered, for Article 42 clearly states that ‘should the Security 
Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or 
have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land as may 
be necessary’.77 There is, therefore, a prerequisite that the Security Council 
consider all measures ‘not involving the use of armed forces’ before considering 
greater measures.
78
 Such a requirement, in theory, would ensure that the Security 
Council only exercises its power to authorise measures involving armed force 
where it is a measure of ‘last resort’ and no other ‘non-military option for the 
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prevention or peaceful resolution of [a] crisis’ is capable of ending the threat to or 
breach of international peace and security.
79
  
Article 2(7): Non-UN Intervention in Essentially Domestic Matters 
Article 2(7), unlike the Articles referenced above, specifically codifies the 
principle of non-intervention in relation to the United Nations itself. It does so by 
preventing the United Nations from ‘interven[ing] in matters which are essentially 
within the domestic jurisdiction of any State’.80 In addition, it clarifies not only 
that the United Nations must refrain from intervening in essentially domestic 
matters, but also that States must refrain from referring matters to the United 
Nations for settlement where they are domestic in nature.
81
 The only exception to 
the limitation set out in Article 2(7) is contained within it and refers to Chapter 
VII authorisation.
82
 Thus, while Article 2(7) protects States from United Nations 
intervention in domestic matters, the Article does provide that such a protection 
does not remove the ability of the United Nations to authorise measures under 
Chapter VII where the matter is a threat to international peace and security.
83
 The 
United Nations has frequently invoked Chapter VII where it has deemed that a 
conflict, whether inter-state or internal, has posed a threat to international peace 
and security, as could be seen in the Security Council response to the Somali civil 
war in 1992.
84
 In this case the Security Council deemed that the ‘magnitude of the 
human tragedy caused by the conflict … constitute[d] a threat to international 
                                                 
79
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peace and security, although the civil war was undoubtedly domestic in nature.
85
 
Therefore, as noted by Nolte, since then, even internal conflicts are not deemed to 
be protected by the Article 2(7) prohibition on interference in domestic affairs.
86
  
The inclusion of a specific provision removing the ability of the United Nations to 
intervene in domestic matters shows a deliberate fortification of the non-
intervention principle, manifest not only in relation to State-to-State interaction, 
but also State-to-organisation interactions. As Shen observes, this is evidenced by 
the fact that, unlike the League of Nations Covenant, which stated that the 
Council would make recommendations regarding matters ‘solely within the 
domestic jurisdiction’ of a State,87 the United Nations Charter extends this, 
disallowing United Nations intervention in matters ‘essentially within the 
domestic jurisdiction’.88 This therefore means that the United Nations has ‘further 
developed’89 the principle of non-intervention, resulting in its becoming ‘one of 
the seven basic principles of the United Nations and indeed the entire international 
community’.90 
Kınacıoğlu comments that, although the Charter fails to provide any concrete 
definitions for the terms ‘not to intervene’91 and ‘matters which are essentially 
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within the domestic jurisdiction’,92 Article 2(7) can, under a strict interpretation, 
protect States from unwarranted and unnecessary violations of the principle of 
non-intervention.
93
 This is done whilst still permitting the United Nations to 
maintain power to authorise measures where circumstances fulfil the Chapter VII 
test.
94
 However, as Schachter and Higgins note, the failure to establish concrete 
definition of intervention or essentially domestic matters has resulted in a 
flexibility which was, arguably, never intended.
95
 Accordingly, United Nations 
organs have ‘a good deal of leeway in applying [the] terms to particular cases’.96 
Regardless of whether a proper interpretation of Article 2(7) has been made 
regularly by various bodies, the Article provides a tangible sign of the importance 
of ensuring that the sovereignty of States is maintained through the non-
intervention of either other States or international organisations.  
The Purpose behind the Principle 
Having considered the creation of the principle of non-intervention and the 
manner in which it became a clear and codified custom, two basic rationalisations 
for its existence can be seen: the creation and continuance of peace on an 
international plane; and the removal of imperial designs against weaker States. 
While it is by no means contended that non-intervention alone can create and 
sustain peace on an international level, it is argued that maintaining the 
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independence and sovereignty of States enables interaction without fear of 
imminent intervention in domestic policy. As Shen notes, exceptions to the 
principle of non-intervention (outside Chapter VII authorisation) allows ‘for 
powerful States to continue their dominance over the world politically, militarily 
and otherwise’.97  
The importance of the non-intervention principle in ensuring that international 
peace and security are maintained was specifically, and consistently, referred to in 
the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations 
and Co-operation among States (the ‘Friendly Relations Declaration’).98 The 
Friendly Relations Declaration noted ‘the importance of maintaining and 
strengthening international peace founded upon freedom, equality [and] justice’ 
and reaffirmed that the ‘purpose of the United Nations can be implemented only if 
States enjoy sovereign equality and comply fully with the requirements of this 
principle’.99 More importantly, at three different points, the Friendly Relations 
Declaration specifically records the importance of: observing States’ ‘obligation 
not to intervene in the affairs of any other States’; ‘refrain[ing] in their 
international relations from military, political, economic or any other form of 
coercion aimed against the political independence or territorial integrity of any 
State’; and ‘refrain[ing] in their international relations from the threat or use of 
force’.100 In marking the importance of allowing States to act independently and 
without fear of unwarranted intrusion, the Friendly Relations Declaration also 
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indicates the direct correlation between the continuance of peaceful relations 
between States and adherence to the non-intervention principle.
101
 Non-
intervention as a principle also protects smaller, weaker countries from the 
imperialist intentions of larger countries seeking to gain control of other countries 
for political or economic gain.
102
 The principle of non-intervention has, through 
time, developed into a custom which not only forms the basis of international 
legal principles but also affords the continuance of international peace and 
security. Through the formation of the League of Nations in 1919,
103
 the principle 
of non-intervention had become a customary norm in international law. In 1949 
the International Court of Justice found in the Corfu Channel Case that ‘respect 
for territorial sovereignty is an essential foundation of international relations’.104 
The same sentiment was expressed in 1986 in Military and Paramilitary Activities 
in and against Nicaragua, where the Court noted that ‘the fundamental principle 
of State sovereignty [is that] on which the whole of international law rests’.105 The 
independent opinion of Judge Sette-Camara further supported the statement, for 
he suggested that ‘the non-use of force as well as non-intervention … are not only 
cardinal principles of customary international law but could in addition be 
recognised as peremptory rules of customary international law which impose 
obligations on all States’.106 The principle of non-intervention was confirmed in 
Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo, where the Court noted that 
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intervention in another State violated the principle of non-intervention.
107
 
Therefore, if any argument for the use of humanitarian intervention can be made, 
it must consider whether there is the scope and ability to override such a 
fundamental tenet of international law in the name of protecting civilians and 
bringing to an end internal conflicts that are seen to jeopardise the human rights of 
individuals.  
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            Chapter Three: The Theory of Humanitarian Intervention  
The Theory of Humanitarian Intervention 
Introduction 
Chapter Two considered the three main exceptions to the Article 2(4) restriction 
on the threat or use of force: Chapter VII Security Council authorisation;
1
 
collective or individual self-defence under Article 51
2
 of the Charter; and consent 
to the threat or use of force within a State’s territory.3 Each exception exists 
within the Charter, providing legitimate circumstances where the prohibition of 
force may be disregarded, and was formed within a “State-centred system”. It was 
only after the Second World War that international law began to turn from a State-
centric system to one which placed greater importance on the rights of 
individuals. With that change in focus, a possible fourth exception emerged in the 
form of humanitarian intervention.
4
 As Peters notes, ‘with the codification of 
international human rights after the Holocaust and World War II’, the 
international legal system placed increased reliance on the importance of 
protecting human rights and ‘State sovereignty and human rights [were not] 
approached in a balancing process … but ... tackled on the basis of a presumption 
in favour of humanity’.5 However, regardless of the greater legal focus on 
individual rights, humanitarian intervention has no clear standing within the 
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Charter. Benjamin comments that ‘since the inception of the [Charter] 
humanitarian intervention has been considered illegal, although the Charter does 
not explicitly ban it’.6 The reason for unilateral humanitarian intervention often 
being labelled as ‘illegal’7 or ‘illegitimate’8 comes from the position that 
humanitarian intervention need not exist under the pre-existing exception of 
Chapter VII authorisation. Instead it is proposed to exist under a wholly separate 
exception: one which has little basis under the Charter other than under the 
auspices of maintaining international peace and security, according to some 
proponents of humanitarian intervention.
9
 Due to a continued lack of Security 
Council pre-authorisation and oversight in unilateral humanitarian intervention, 
many academics
10
 argue that ‘the cost of the potential abuse of pretextual 
interventions … outweigh[s] any benefit derived from altruistic interventions’.11 
Thus, failures to obtain any form of UN approval prior to so-called humanitarian 
interventions have led to them becoming the ‘bête noire of the international law 
system’.12 Further, such failure has resulted in the Report of the International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty recommending the creation of 
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a similar principle, the responsibility to protect, based and placed within the 
Chapter VII exception.
13
 
In order to determine the legal acceptability of any form of exception to the 
prohibition on force based on humanitarian principles, the background and 
development of the original concept of humanitarian intervention must be 
understood. It was noted in Chapter One that this thesis seeks only to discuss non-
consensual trans-boundary military interventions by a single State or group of 
States, which are justified on the basis of ending or preventing grave and 
widespread violations of fundamental human rights of individuals who are not 
nationals of the intervening State, and for which the acting States have not 
received prior Security Council Chapter VII authorisation. First, this chapter will 
address the theoretical foundations upon which humanitarian interventions lie, 
looking at the principles and justifications for the use of force in other States. 
Secondly, the moral and legal arguments that humanitarian interventionists 
advance to justify the creation of a new legal norm will be analysed critically. 
Thirdly, this chapter discusses the authority upon which humanitarian intervention 
is based, the reasoning behind the lack of Security Council authorisation in 
humanitarian interventions, and the possibility of abuse in humanitarian 
intervention. In so doing this chapter does not expressly consider interventions 
themselves; rather, an analysis of possible humanitarian interventions will be 
undertaken in Chapter Four so as to allow a comprehensive study of interventions 
both before and after 1990. 
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Foundations of Humanitarian Interventions 
Humanitarian interventionists argue that while States maintain sovereignty, such 
sovereignty is inherently tied to the ability of the State to ‘secure the fundamental 
rights of its citizens’ and that ‘sovereignty exists only to the extent that [the State] 
facilitates that function’.14 Accordingly, Franck suggests that ‘governments derive 
their power from the consent of those they govern’,15 for without the existence of 
individuals within the State there would be nothing to govern.
16
 Indeed, the State 
itself would fail to exist – for mere territory does not encompass statehood, as is 
noted in the permanent population criterion of the Montevideo Convention.
17
 
Eckert observes that, in return for the power afforded to the government of a State 
by its people, the former must accept that the citizens of the State have 
fundamental rights which must be afforded, protected, and allowed by the latter.
18
  
The ‘social contract’19 between the State and its people is what gives rise to the 
State’s implicit promise to ‘respect those rights and the limitations they place on 
sovereign power’.20 Where the ‘contract’ is broken, there is a consequent loss of 
State rights, such as the right to non-intervention.
21
 Thus, Nardin asserts that ‘a 
government that commits great crimes against its own people or some portion of 
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them cannot be said to represent them … [such] misconduct undermines [the 
State’s] claim to sovereignty’.22 It follows, therefore, that sovereignty as a concept 
‘encompasses both rights and responsibilities’23 with human rights being its 
‘guiding principle’24 and ‘sovereignty and independence becom[ing] 
conditional’.25 However, the responsibility to ‘guard the rights of [the State’s] 
own citizens’26 extends not only to the State itself but also to the international 
community as a whole. This means that where the international community is 
aware that a State is either ‘unwilling or unable to protect’27 its citizens, other 
States must assist ‘those oppressed subjects’.28 Such a theory is derived from the 
teachings of Grotius, who posited that, where a tyrant practised atrocities against 
his citizens, it was not fathomable that foreign States had no ability to fight on 
behalf of the oppressed citizens – thus, some form of intervention must be allowed 
on purely moral grounds.
29
  
Moral and Legal Arguments 
Arguments for humanitarian intervention can be broadly categorised into two 
different types: moral and legal. This section first critically analyses the moral 
arguments advanced in defence of humanitarian intervention and thereafter 
analyses the legal arguments used to suggest that humanitarian interventions do 
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not violate the principle of non-intervention enshrined in the United Nations 
Charter. It was suggested by Tesón that there are three main moral assumptions 
for humanitarian intervention: ‘We all have (1) the obligation to respect [human] 
rights; (2) the obligation to promote such respect for all persons; (3) depending on 
the circumstances, the obligation to rescue victims of tyranny or anarchy’.30 If 
these three moral assumptions are accepted, then it follows that there is a general 
duty upon all people to ensure that all rights are respected.
31
 Sherman extends this 
argument, claiming that where people are deprived of their basic human rights, the 
rest of the international community has a duty to rescue the abused from their 
abusers.
32
 Thus, a common thread of such arguments is that humanitarian 
intervention is ‘morally permissible’ to end injustices perpetrated against others, 
even when they occur within a sovereign State.
33
 However, beyond the moral 
basis of protecting those who cannot protect themselves, there is a general lack of 
clear justification for the creation of an obligation for all persons to rescue those 
whose rights have been violated. Indeed, national law suggests that there is no 
general duty to act in aid of other citizens; though there may be a personal moral 
impetus to help those being harmed, there is usually the requirement of a special 
relationship to exist before a failure to act can be considered an offence.
34
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Chesterman maintains that a central tenet of moral arguments in favour of 
humanitarian intervention is that there exists a choice between either doing 
something, such as military intervention, or doing nothing, which would be 
morally abhorrent.
35
 The presentation of such an “either/or” theory was made by 
the then-Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Tony Blair, in commenting upon 
the NATO intervention in Kosovo,
36
 when he suggested that the international 
community had either the choice to stand by and do nothing to help the plight of 
Albanian Kosovars, or to act in the form of military intervention involving the use 
of ‘B-52s, cluster bombs and depleted uranium ordnance’.37 That it is difficult 
morally to refrain from action while innocent people are subjected to horrendous 
violence does not equate to a legal justification for intervention.
38
 Chesterman 
contends that the oversimplification of the humanitarian intervention into an 
“either/or” question both refuses to recognise the possibility of alternative 
measures aimed at peacefully bringing a crisis to an end, and creates a dichotomy 
that is ‘false, misleading, and dangerous’.39  
Tesón asserts that the use of moral justifications, in addition to legal justifications, 
is necessary on the basis that, in other areas of law, there is a direct connection 
between law and morality.
40
 Accordingly, he suggests that the tradition of staying 
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away from purely moral arguments in international law should be departed from, 
in preference to focussing on a theoretical framework.
41
 Tesón maintains that 
humanitarian intervention can exist legally under international law on the basis 
that there exists a moral requirement to act.
42
 However, Austin argued that there is 
a clear distinction between the law as it is and the law as it ought to be.
43
 Thus, 
regardless of any moral objections one might have regarding a particular law, the 
law still continues to exist; moral disdain does not remove the existence of law – 
it stands by itself.
44
 Hart concurred, suggesting that while morality and the law 
may intersect at times, the law is still separate.
45
 Therefore, while the creation of 
law may be influenced by moral standards, moral standards themselves cannot 
create law. Moreover, even if it were accepted that morals could create law, the 
inclusion of a broad moral philosophy fails to acknowledge that international 
ideological and cultural beliefs are too diverse to apply to a single principle.
46
 
Moral justifications, or situations of excusable breach, are by their very nature 
part of ‘the pattern of the Grotian just war logic’47 and come ‘from the world of 
political science or philosophy [rather] than from international law’.48 Thus it is 
advanced that whilst the inclusion of moral principles in international law is not 
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objectionable per se, the sole use of moral justifications to argue for the creation 
of a norm lacks the necessary framework inherent in international principles.
49
  
Finally, the concept of a morally acceptable exception being able to become 
legally satisfactory stems from the theory of ‘just war’,50 which, as Bothe notes, 
related to where a war ‘was lawful when fought for a just purpose by just 
means’.51 The just war principle itself was developed both ‘at the time of some of 
Europe’s most savage religious wars’52 and when ‘war was considered a 
legitimate means to conduct international relations’.53 As such, Grotius explained 
the purpose behind just war was punishment,
54
 which was ‘necessary to preserve 
order in a society lacking any higher tribunal to resolve disputes’.55 However, as 
Akehurst has noted, ‘the use of force as a sanction for a breach of an international 
obligation may do more harm than the breach of the international obligation; the 
cure is often worse than the disease’.56 Indeed, the use of force in an already 
volatile environment may be counter-productive,
57
 creating greater violence 
within a State, as was seen in the intervention in Kosovo where ethnic cleansing 
was used as a tool of retaliation against NATO forces.
58
 Resultantly, ‘international 
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legal literature abandoned the “just war doctrine”’59 due to the inherent problem 
that under this doctrine it was ‘impossible to determine in any particular case 
whose case was just and whose not’.60 Consequently, it is doubtful whether a 
theory which relies upon principles of punishment, framed when war was 
considered a normal method of State interaction, and when moral justifications 
were acceptable as legal justifications, could be supported in light of the express 
prohibition in Article 2(4) of the Charter and the move towards a ‘severance of 
morality from the law’.61  
The most significant impediment to a claim that unilateral humanitarian 
intervention is a legal norm is the Article 2(4) prohibition on the threat or use of 
force.
62
 However, humanitarian interventionists claim that Article 2(4) does not 
prohibit all threats or uses of force; rather, it only prohibits force used ‘against 
[the] territorial integrity or political independence of any State’.63 In supporting 
this, Tesón argues that, had the intention of the drafters been to prohibit all uses of 
force, they would have done so expressly by refraining from including a 
qualifying phrase.
64
 Accordingly, scholars such as Stone suggest that 
humanitarian intervention falls outside the Article 2(4) prohibition on the basis 
that the former is consistent with the purposes of the United Nations because the 
protection of human rights is necessary to promote international peace and 
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security.
65
 In advancing this view, Tesón further contends that interventions in 
tyrannical or anarchical States are in accordance with the Charter on the basis that 
they promote human rights.
66
 Therefore, given that the promotion of human rights 
is a purpose of the Charter, to prohibit the use of force under that purpose is 
claimed to be a distortion of Article 2(4).
67
 However, as Chesterman observes, the 
travaux préparatoires clarified that the intention was not to create a limited 
prohibition on the use of force,
68
 but instead a broad prohibition in line with the 
purpose of the United Nations to ‘save succeeding generations from the scourge 
of war’.69 During the United Nations Conference on International Organization, in 
1945, the United States declared that ‘the intention of the authors of the original 
text was to state in the broadest terms an absolute all-inclusive prohibition; the 
phrase ‘or in any other manner’ was designed to ensure that there should be no 
loop-holes’.70 Furthermore, as Brownlie asserts,71 the inclusion of ‘territorial 
integrity or political independence of any State’ in the wording of Article 2(4) 
strengthens rather than restricts the prohibition of the use of force.
72
 This is a 
proposition supported by Massa, who observes that the phrase was ‘inserted as a 
guarantee for small States to reinforce the impermissible character of recourses to 
                                                 
65
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force against a State’.73 The narrow interpretation of Article 2(4) is therefore an 
attempt to apply the Charter in a manner that provides some legal basis for the 
principle of humanitarian intervention. However, any interpretation of Article 2(4) 
that suggests military intervention is not a violation of the territorial or political 
integrity of a State is, as Schachter posits, only conceivable if using ‘an Orwellian 
construction of those terms’.74  
This thesis consequently proposes that both the moral and legal arguments for 
humanitarian interventions fail to support the creation of a legal norm. The 
contention that all people have an obligation to rescue others from situations of 
grave dangers lacks legal justification. Indeed, national law specifically moves 
away from any legal obligation to rescue others.
75
 Furthermore, the general 
reliance humanitarian interventionists place on moral arguments fails to recognise 
that international law exists separately from moral theory.
76
 Moreover, the 
existence of a moral argument, however persuasive, does not result in the creation 
of law – though it may influence later developments in law. On this basis, the 
moral arguments put forward, while valid on a philosophical level, fail to create 
the necessary foundation for the argument that humanitarian intervention exists as 
an international norm. It is therefore proposed that the legal argument that 
humanitarian intervention is permissible under Article 2(4) is tenuous at best and 
directly contradicts the intentions made clear in the drafting of the Charter. Thus, 
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there exist no moral or legal justifications which would result in the creation of an 
international norm of humanitarian intervention.  
Authority in Humanitarian Intervention and the Possibility of 
Abuse 
Under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Security Council may authorise the use of 
force where there is a threat to international peace and security; such authorisation 
provides any resultant intervention with a legal basis.
77
 Yet, humanitarian 
interventionists propose that an exception – outside the pre-existing exceptions to 
the prohibition on the use of force – should be created and which would 
encompass humanitarian intervention.
78
 Such an exception would allow States, 
independent of oversight, to determine if and when a humanitarian intervention 
was appropriate, with little to stop larger, more powerful States from 
‘manipulat[ing] humanitarian concerns and attempt[ing] to use the doctrine as a 
weapon against weaker States’.79 It is for this reason that, even where academics 
agree morally that humanitarian disasters which ‘shock the conscience of 
mankind’ must be stopped, the theory’s failure to require Chapter VII 
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authorisation has resulted in a rejection of the humanitarian intervention 
principle.
80
 
The collective argument for allowing unauthorised humanitarian interventions 
does not wholly lack merit; under Article 27(3) of the Charter, the permanent 
members of the Security Council hold the ability to veto substantive resolutions 
with which they disagree on moral, political, or economic grounds.
81
 Nakhjavani 
asserts that, accordingly, the Security Council can be, and has been, ‘render[ed] 
… ineffective’ due to its highly politicised nature, resulting in an inability to act 
swiftly or at all.
82
 Such failure to respond adequately due to political issues was 
evident during the Rwandan genocide, when the plan to deploy 5,500 troops to 
Kigali
83
 was resisted by the United States partly due to ‘public reactions to the 
debacle in Somalia and the aborted mission to Haiti’84 and as a consequence of 
Presidential Decision Directive 25,
85
 which noted that peace operations were not 
to be the ‘centrepiece of US foreign policy’86 unless in ‘American interests’.87 
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Further, as Tesón and Gourevitch comment, many States failed to refer to the 
massacre in Rwanda as ‘genocide’ in Security Council meetings in order to avoid 
the political ramifications of their policies of inaction.
88
 Indeed, only after the 
Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Rwanda was published, did 
Security Council resolutions finally refer to ‘genocide’ in Rwanda.89 The refusal 
of States to acknowledge that the crisis in Rwanda had escalated to genocide, 
when evidence of that fact was apparent,
90
 was based on attempts to avoid the 
political fallout of inaction. Additionally, it delayed real attempts to bring the 
crisis to an end, resulting in thousands of deaths.
91
 Rwanda is not, however, the 
only instance where the Security Council failed to act due to a political deadlock. 
For example, despite the Liberian representative’s repeated calls to add the crisis 
in Liberia to the Security Council agenda,
92
 it was never added, with the United 
States insisting that ‘the resolution of [the Liberian] civil war is a Liberian 
responsibility’.93 Moreover, during the crisis in Kosovo, Russia and China used 
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the threat of veto to ensure that Resolution 1203 (1998) did not authorise the use 
of force,
94
 which, humanitarian interventionists argue, was the catalyst for NATO 
involvement.
95
  
Given the effects that both politics and the veto power have had within the 
Security Council, humanitarian interventionists such as Eckert maintain that there 
must be a legal ability for States to exert ‘the unilateral use of force to achieve a 
humanitarian purpose’.96 However, due to political stonewalling in the period 
shortly after the Cold War, the determination that a bypass to the system of 
Security Council authorisation should exist simply trades an undesirable situation 
for an even less desirable set of circumstances. The lack of Security Council 
authorisation, as noted by Rytter, results in humanitarian intervention lacking an 
‘explicit legal basis’.97 Indeed, without a solid legal foundation, humanitarian 
intervention is legitimised only by the argument that there exists a ‘positive moral 
duty’98 or ‘moral imperative’99 which can be invoked in order to protect the 
innocent, or that, in exigent circumstances, humanitarian intervention may fall 
under an ‘excusable breach’.100 Without any form of oversight from the 
international community before intervention takes place, ‘humanitarian 
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intervention [becomes] prone to abuse’,101 for ‘experience has shown how readily 
more powerful states have used the pretext of a higher good to impose their will 
and values on weaker states’.102 Indeed, the risk of abuse is made greater by the 
fact that the principle of humanitarian intervention lacks a ‘coherent legal 
regime’,103 which allows States to use vague moral concepts to hide their true 
intentions.
104
 States have utilised vague humanitarian grounds to justify 
intervention with the intention of colonisation before;
105
 however, in response to 
such previous abuses, nothing has been done to remove the prospect of similar 
abuse in its formulation.
106
 Accordingly, the creation of a humanitarian 
intervention exception would risk the creation of a hierarchical State system 
similar to that in colonial times, in which “civilised” States, viewed as the 
protectors of human rights, would intervene in “less civilised” States for the 
latter’s own protection.107 The likelihood of such a humanitarian intervention 
principle being abused is further supported by the fact that States have abused the 
right of intervention in well-structured legal principles such as self-defence. As 
will be noted in Chapter Four, the United States 1965 intervention in the 
Dominican Republic
108
 and 1983 intervention in Grenada, which were justified as 
operations for the protection of nationals abroad, but were actually based on the 
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United States hoping to be able to influence the States’ political structures.109 
Thus, as Chesterman notes, providing further opportunities for intervention with 
little legal structure would only result in the creation of a dangerous norm.
110
 
Brownlie’s assertion that ‘no genuine case of humanitarian intervention has 
occurred, with the possible exception of the occupation of Syria in 1860 and 
1861’111 may sound exaggerated; yet, the reality of how open to abuse 
humanitarian intervention is must be confronted, for ‘the fact that the use of force 
for humanitarian purposes is susceptible to abuse and may lead to casualties is too 
important to ignore’.112 While humanitarian interventionists may argue that every 
norm is prone to abuse, and that States could just as easily abuse the right to self-
defence or other justifications for the use of force, it must be considered, as 
Hipold notes, that the ‘the problem [of abuse] is particularly pressing in cases 
where a satisfactory control mechanism is lacking’.113 The lack of Security 
Council authorisation for humanitarian intervention means that there is a 
definitive absence of any form of control mechanism; thus, while the Security 
Council may, at times, work ineffectively, it at least provides a ‘safety net’ of 
supervision that humanitarian intervention does not. The more pragmatic response 
to concerns over Security Council ineffectiveness would surely be to address the 
factors which result in delays, such as those seen during the Rwandan genocide 
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and the crisis in Kosovo, and to create a system to limit the effects of over-
politicisation and veto power.
114
 
Conclusion 
At the end of the Second World War the international community was in a state of 
shock.
115
 Years of war had left economies in ruins, the populations of nations 
scarred, and infrastructure devastated.
116
 It was on this basis that international law 
began to become more centred on the individual,
117
 particularly with the inception 
of the Charter, which ushered in greater respect for fundamental rights and 
freedoms.
118
 Moreover, the Charter emphasised the importance of maintaining 
international peace and security universally.
119
 As a consequence, humanitarian 
interventionists found that individuals could be placed at the centre of 
sovereignty; with sovereignty being ‘limited by human rights’ and ‘from the 
outset determined and qualified by humanity’.120 Upon this basis States gain not 
only their sovereignty from the individual but also rights and responsibilities.
121
 
Only where a State fulfils its responsibilities to its people can it maintain its rights 
to non-intervention and protection from the use of force;
122
 when States fail to 
afford citizens their fundamental rights or fail to protect them, their rights to non-
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intervention disappear.
123
 It is at this point, where theoretically a State’s rights are 
withdrawn, that humanitarian interventions may occur.
124
 On the basis that the 
State no longer has a right to non-intervention, there is no need for intervention to 
be authorised by the Security Council for the State has failed in its duties. 
Furthermore, authorisation is disregarded due to the presumed weaknesses and 
past failures of the Security Council to remain effective.
125
 Past failures to prevent 
over-politicisation
126
 and misuse of the veto power
127
 are used as reasons for 
avoiding the possible prolonging of humanitarian crises and Security Council 
authorisation is ignored completely. However, the failure to obtain Security 
Council authorisation provides greater opportunities for long-term damage to 
occur through the abuse of the humanitarian intervention principle. Moreover, a 
lack of oversight and vigorous debate results in the ability for States to take 
unilateral action under the guise of humanitarian grounds while using 
humanitarian intervention as a ‘high-sounding and convenient tool for 
maintaining, and yet concealing, their dominance and their supremacy’.128 It is 
upon this understanding of humanitarian intervention that Chapter Four analyses 
various proposed humanitarian interventions, their premises and their legal 
justifications.  
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           Chapter Four: Humanitarian Intervention in Practice 
Humanitarian Intervention in Practice 
Introduction 
Academics suggest that between the creation of the United Nations Charter in 
1945 and 2001, when the principle of the responsibility to protect was first 
proposed, various humanitarian interventions occurred which created the 
necessary State practice to result in humanitarian intervention becoming custom.
1
 
In order for any form of custom to have developed, there must have been both 
‘extensive and virtually uniform’ State practice, and evidence of opinio juris.2 
However, what can be seen from the interventions which have taken place is that 
State practice has been far from extensive, with only two or three possible 
humanitarian interventions taking place in that time. Additionally, State practice 
varied drastically between interventions, in both method and reason for 
intervention.
3
 States have assiduously refrained from naming humanitarian 
intervention as the legal justification for their intervention;
4
 instead, States have 
relied mainly upon the justification of self-defence, indicating that they 
understood that humanitarian intervention as a political, not legal, concept and 
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therefore inadmissible as a legitimate justification for intervention.
5
 Furthermore, 
while States did cite, mostly in political terms, humanitarian aims among the 
reasons for such interventions, at no point was humanitarian intervention used as 
the sole reason for action. It follows that no custom of humanitarian intervention 
could have been created and, therefore, humanitarian intervention as a concept is 
only a moral theory based upon no law.  
Of all the interventions which took place, it is proposed that only two, Iraq and 
Kosovo, qualify for what may be considered humanitarian intervention. Both 
circumstances, however, ‘lack the necessary opinio juris that might transform the 
exception into the rule’.6 While custom can develop over a short period of time, as 
in the case of space exploration, there is still a requirement that there is 
consistency across the States participating and the existence of opinio juris.
7
 This 
chapter will review the various suggested humanitarian interventions in two 
sections; first, interventions during the Cold War and before 1990, and secondly 
those between 1990 and 2001. In examining the interventions of the latter half of 
the twentieth century, this thesis will determine whether any custom in relation to 
humanitarian intervention could have been formed through State practice and 
opinio juris.  
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Humanitarian Interventions prior to 1990 
Belgian Interventions in the Congo 
During the 1960s, Belgium intervened in the Congo on two separate occasions: 
the first, in 1960, was shortly after the Congo declared independence;
8
 and the 
second intervention was undertaken with the United States, in 1964.
9
 Military 
discontent, caused by racial tensions, came to a head shortly after the Congo 
declared independence from Belgium
10
 with the mutiny of the Force Publique.
11
 
Within days the country was in chaos and both European and Congolese citizens 
were the victims of murder, assault and rape.
12
 In response to the mutiny and 
violence, Europeans began to panic and flee to Elizabethtown and Stanleyville.
13
 
On 10
th
 July 1960, Belgian forces already stationed within the country were 
ordered to take control of cities in an attempt to halt the progress of violence and, 
in addition, further Belgian troops were sent to continue to ensure order.
14
 The 
Congolese reaction to the Belgian intervention was far from positive; the 
Congolese government sought assistance from the United Nations in relation to 
what it termed ‘an act of aggression’.15 Following debate at the 873rd meeting of 
the Security Council on 13
th
 July 1960, a unanimous resolution was passed, 
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calling upon Belgium to withdraw its troops and authorising United Nations 
military assistance.
16
 Although Belgium did note in the Security Council debate 
that it had intervened in the Congolese crisis in the hope of ‘protecting human 
lives in general’, it repeatedly stated that the primary purpose for the intervention 
was ‘to ensur[e] the safety of European and other members of the public’17 and 
that troops ‘intervened to the extent necessary to fulfil our sacred duty to protect 
the lives and honour of our nationals’.18 It is the continued reference to the 
protection of nationals that resulted in the intervention not being categorised as 
constituting a humanitarian intervention.
19
 
The second Belgian intervention in the Congo followed four years of unrest after 
the intervention in the 1960 crisis. A ‘government of reconciliation’ was 
established with Moise Tshombe, the leader of an attempted secessionist 
movement in the 1960 crisis, being appointed Prime Minister.
20
 Responses to 
Tshombe’s appointment were poor, with rebel forces loyal to former Prime 
Minister Patrice Lumumba advancing throughout the Congo.
21
 Tshombe, in an 
attempt to control the fast-spreading rebel forces, employed white mercenaries to 
quash the rebel movement.
22
 With defeat impending, rebel forces notified the 
Secretary-General that 500 white hostages would be executed in the event of the 
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continued use of mercenary power.
23
 The United States and Belgium received 
authorisation from Tshombe to undertake a hostage rescue operation within the 
Congo in 1964,
24
 and on 24
th
 November 1964 Belgian paratroopers commenced 
the operation, and notice of Tshombe’s request was lodged with the Security 
Council.
25
 Though the intervention was authorised by the Congolese government, 
many African States interpreted the intervention as a further colonial assault 
against the newly-independent African country.
26
 While the rescue of 
approximately 2,000 foreign nationals was humanitarian in nature, the 
intervention itself was one of self-defence and consent.
27
 That an intervention is 
based on self-defence or consent does not preclude the possibility that 
humanitarian objectives may be gained; what should be considered, however, is 
the legal basis upon which the State commenced its intervention.
28
 That consent 
was given by Tshombe means that, factually, a humanitarian intervention, as an 
exception to Article 2(4), could not have occurred.
29
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United States Intervention in the Dominican Republic 
Following several years of political instability and discontent in the Dominican 
Republic, the junta leader at the time, Donald Reid, attempted to foil a plotted 
coup by arresting the officers responsible on 24
th
 April 1965.
30
 However, instead 
of preventing the coup, a revolt ensued, which led the Dominican Republic’s 
descent into civil war. Seeing the violent clashes between the military factions, the 
United States declared its intention to ‘put the necessary American troops ashore 
in order to give protection to hundreds of Americans who are still in the 
Dominican’.31 On 28th April 1965, troops were deployed to the Dominican 
Republic with the claimed intent of rescuing American nationals from possible 
harm. If the purpose of the intervention was to rescue nationals, then the United 
States’ action would not constitute an example of a successful humanitarian 
intervention as the rescue of nationals abroad does not fall within the auspices of 
humanitarian intervention; rather it is part of the concept of self-defence.
32
 
However, later statements made by Johnson suggest that the purpose of the 
intervention was not solely that of rescuing nationals; four days after troops 
landed in the Dominican Republic President Johnson stated ‘the American nations 
cannot, must not, and will not permit the establishment of another Communist 
government’.33 Were the intervention to have been aimed at ensuring the removal 
of a possible Communist regime, then the United States’ intervention provides an 
excellent example of a State claiming “humanitarian purposes” (rescuing 
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nationals) when intending to implement internal change through intervention. 
Regardless of whether the intervention was based on rescuing nationals or 
implementing internal change, it does not provide a basis for a norm of 
humanitarian intervention to develop. Therefore, the United States intervention in 
the Dominican Republic cannot be considered an example of emerging state 
practice of humanitarian interventions.
34
  
Indian Intervention in East Pakistan 
Intervention in East Pakistan was precipitated by the Pakistani government’s 
systematic and ‘brutal military crackdown’35 during which the Pakistani army 
‘attempt[ed] to exterminate or drive out of the country a large part of the Hindu 
population’ and participated in the ‘raping of women, the destruction of villages 
and towns, and the looting of property’36 following the Awami League majority 
election in the National Assembly elections of 1970.
37
 The resultant flow of 
‘approximately nine to ten million Bengali refugees’38 across India’s border and 
repeated ‘border incidents’39 between Pakistan and India served only to create 
greater tensions between the two countries. Following the Pakistani bombing of 
‘an Indian air base located miles within the Indian border’, India sent troops into 
East Pakistan and, within just a few days, forced the surrender of the Pakistani 
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army.
40
 Upon forcible Indian entry into Pakistan an immediate session of the 
Security Council was convened, with what was termed by Mahalingam as a 
‘firestorm’ of condemnation.41 In justification, India claimed that the intervention 
was in accordance with their ‘right to take … all appropriate and necessary 
measures to safeguard [their] security and defence against aggression from 
Pakistan’.42 However, it was India’s recurring reference to Pakistan’s human 
rights abuses which has caused many academics to suggest that India’s 
intervention in East Pakistan was a ‘prime example of humanitarian 
intervention’.43 Having already justified the Indian intervention into Pakistan on 
the grounds of self-defence, the Indian representative thereafter noted that ‘we 
have on this particular occasion absolutely nothing but the purest of motives and 
the purest of intentions: to rescue the people of East Bengal from what they are 
suffering’.44  
In direct contradiction of the theory that India based a second justification of its 
intervention on the right to humanitarian intervention is that, at no point, did India 
state that it relied upon the principle of humanitarian intervention. Instead, the 
Indian representative repeatedly asserted that ‘[India] will not tolerate intrusion, 
aggression in our territory by the Pakistan Army’;45 ‘Pakistan … start[ed] military 
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aggression against India on 3 December’;46 and that ‘Pakistan carried out a 
premeditated and massive aggression against India’.47 Each statement served to 
clarify the Indian position – that they had acted in self-defence in response to an 
attack by the Pakistani Army – rather than for reasons of humanitarian altruism.  
However, had India attempted to justify the intervention further as being 
humanitarian, the response from the international community clearly indicated 
that such a justification would have had no foundation in law. Throughout the 
Security Council debates, and General Assembly Meetings, States referred to the 
importance of the non-intervention principle,
48
 and thus failed to agree that India 
had acted within the rights of humanitarian intervention. Moreover, several States 
maintained that, ‘no matter how grave has been the situation in Pakistan with 
regard to the humanitarian question of the refugees, nothing can justify armed 
action against the territorial integrity of a Member State’.49 The consideration of 
what India claimed to be justification for their intervention is important in order to 
determine whether the requisite opinio juris for the creation of a humanitarian 
intervention norm was present.
50
 Given that India never advanced a justification 
of humanitarian intervention (and that even if India had done so, such a 
justification would have been rejected by the international community), the Indian 
intervention in East Pakistan is not an example of the successful use of 
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humanitarian intervention for a justification of the use of force. Therefore, the 
intervention cannot be said to form part of the requisite State practice and opinio 
juris needed for the formation of customary international law.  
Vietnamese Intervention in Cambodia 
As noted by O’Donoghue, the actions of the Khmer Rouge resulted in ‘scenes of 
some of the most atrocious carnages of the 20
th
 century’;51 the regime maintained 
rule through repression, victimisation, the systematic violation of human rights, 
and murder, with academics estimating that between 750,000
52
 and 2 million 
people
53
 died as a result of Khmer Rouge rule. The crisis commenced as tensions 
mounted between Cambodia and Vietnam, eventually resulting in fighting along 
the Cambodian and Vietnamese borders in April 1977.
54
 Throughout 1977 and 
1978 skirmishes between the States continued, escalating in nature and the mutual 
exchange of blame for such uses of force until, in December 1978, Vietnam 
invaded Cambodia. It claimed that it had acted in self-defence after the Khmer 
Rouge ‘had violated Vietnamese territory when the Khmer regime had been 
overthrown by the Cambodian resistance’.55 In further justification, Vietnam 
referred to the continual Khmer Rouge use of force along the border ‘between 
Vietnam and Kampuchea’, referring to it as a ‘border war’.56 Vietnam denied any 
participation in the defeat of the Pol Pot regime, maintaining that it had acted only 
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in defence of its borders while the defeat of the Khmer Rouge regime was the 
result of the ‘revolutionary war of the Kampuchean people.57 Regardless of 
Vietnam’s denial of involvement in the defeat of Pol Pot’s regime, Vietnam 
played an important role in removing the Khmer Rouge and is internationally 
recognised as having done so.
58
 Humanitarian intervention was never used as a 
justification for the intervention; instead, Vietnam resolutely claimed it had never 
invaded Cambodia.
59
 Instead, discussion of the viability of humanitarian 
intervention in relation to the Vietnamese intervention was conducted by States in 
the resultant Security Council debates.
60
 The response to discussions of the 
viability of humanitarian intervention was a resounding rejection of the principle 
of humanitarian intervention; France noted ‘the notion that because a regime is 
detestable foreign intervention is justified and forcible overthrow is legitimate is 
extremely dangerous’,61 while Portugal unequivocally stated ‘there are no nor can 
there be any socio-political considerations that would justify the invasion of the 
territory of a sovereign State by the forces of another State’.62 In agreement, 
Australia,
63
 the United Kingdom,
64
 the United States,
65
 New Zealand,
66
 Japan,
67
 
and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
68
 stated that humanitarian 
intervention was in no way acceptable under international law as ‘no other 
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country has a right to topple the Government of Democratic Kampuchea, however 
badly that Government may have treated its people’.69 Consequently, a General 
Assembly resolution was adopted, calling for both the immediate withdrawal of 
all foreign forces from the region and the cessation of foreign intervention in 
South-East Asian States.
70
 Barring Soviet influence,
71
 the international 
community wholly agreed that humanitarian intervention was not a justifiable 
defence under international law; therefore, it is suggested that the Vietnamese 
intervention in Cambodia explicitly serves to show that humanitarian intervention 
is not legal. 
United States Intervention in Grenada 
In October 1983, the then-Prime Minister of Grenada, Maurice Bishop, and 
several of his cabinet members were overthrown and placed under house arrest.
72
 
Protests against the house arrest of Bishop and his cabinet facilitated an attempted 
escape;
73
 however, the escape failed and Bishop, along with several members of 
his cabinet and others aiding the escape, were killed.
74
 Following this, a four-day, 
shoot-on-sight curfew was imposed.
75
 The Organization of Eastern Caribbean 
States (OECS) determined a need for American assistance,
76
 and on 25
th
 October 
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United States troops landed on Grenadian soil.
77
 At the same time as the 
intervention, the involved OECS States made representations regarding the 
foundations and justifications of the intervention; these were based on both 
humanitarian
78
 and defensive grounds.
79
 While the United States initially argued 
to the Security Council that humanitarian intervention could be a valid legal 
justification,
80
 such claims were later retracted by the United States, whereby it 
maintained ‘[w]e did not assert a broad new doctrine of “humanitarian 
intervention”. We relied instead on the narrowest, well-established ground of 
protection of US nationals’.81  
International responses to the justification of humanitarian intervention rejected 
the principle,
82
 labelling the intervention as not ‘compatible with the basic 
principles of the Charter of the United Nations’,83 and confirming that ‘there are 
no circumstances according to the Charter and international law governing inter-
State relations in which military intervention in or invasion of another State is 
permitted’.84 The United States’ second justification of the protection of nationals 
abroad was similarly rejected, with the international community ‘condemning the 
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invasion’.85 As a result, a Security Council resolution denouncing the invasion as 
illegitimate and a violation of international law failed only due to the United 
States’ power of veto.86  
While the United States’ initial justification for the Grenadian intervention was 
humanitarian-based, both the fact the United States abandoned the justification, 
instead relying on the justification of the protection of nationals abroad, and the 
international response denying the existence of a right to humanitarian 
intervention, suggest that while humanitarian intervention may be legitimate 
morally, its legal basis is not substantiated. More importantly, the American 
intervention in Grenada shows the ease with which humanitarian intervention 
justifications can be abused. As Woodward notes, the United States saw the 
political unrest within Grenada as an ‘opportunity to influence the authority 
structure in Grenada, rather than as a desperate situation’.87 
Humanitarian Interventions Post-1990 
Liberia 
In 1989 civil war broke out in Liberia after ‘decades of tribal animosities … 
conflicts and the recurring abuse of power by ruling elites’,88 when Charles 
Taylor, and the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) took control of much 
of Liberia, with then-President Samuel Doe in control of only small parts of the 
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capital.
89
 The fighting between government forces and Taylor’s NPFL continued 
throughout the rest of 1989 and into 1990, with ‘all sides commit[ing] human 
atrocities’.90 As NPFL forces continued to gain control, Doe appealed to the 
United Nations, the United States, and the Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS) to introduce a ‘peace-keeping force into Liberia to forestall 
increasing terror and tension’.91 The appeals to the Security Council were ignored 
due to a regional disinclination to bring the matter before the Council,
92
 while the 
United States refused to become involved in what it deemed to be an ‘internal 
affair’.93 In response to Doe’s requests, ECOWAS established the ECOWAS 
Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) to intervene in Liberia and establish a 
cease-fire, interim government and the ability to hold fair and free elections.
94
 In 
accordance with its mandate, ECOMOG forces ‘landed in Liberia’, coming under 
immediate attack,
95
 and were forced to retaliate through the use of ‘mortars, 
artillery and automatic weapons’.96  
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Levitt comments that, at no point, did the ‘decision or resolution of the ECOWAS 
Standing Mediation Committee mak[e] mention of Doe’s letter’, suggesting that 
the failure to refer explicitly to the letter shows that the invitation was considered 
unimportant.
97
 However, the collective self-defence exception is merely 
‘triggered’ by an invitation and authorisation of intervention; there is no 
requirement for there to be express recognition of that invitation or reference to 
it.
98
 However, Article 53(1) does require Security Council authorisation prior to 
regional involvement, which the ECOMOG force lacked.
99
 Accordingly, the 
intervention lacked the appropriate legal prerequisite. Regardless of the 
intervention’s failure to obtain legal authorisation, the Security Council President 
commended the efforts made by ECOMOG to ‘promote peace and normalcy in 
Liberia’.100 The post-intervention commendation of the ECOMOG intervention 
has been taken by some to signal the creation of a humanitarian intervention 
principle within international law.
101
 However, it should be noted that, in 
commending ECOMOG’s action, the Security Council neither mentioned the 
creation of a new humanitarian intervention norm, nor stated that the requirement 
for pre-intervention authorisation for regional action was no longer legally 
binding. The single feature which suggests that there still existed some legality in 
the ECOWAS intervention is the invitation and authorisation of the use of force 
by Doe, which formed official consent to ECOMOG intervention.  
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While the ECOWAS intervention in Liberia may suggest that an erosion of the 
Article 53 requirement of pre-intervention Security Council authorisation took 
place, the intervention, due to its consensual nature, cannot provide state practice 
for the theory of humanitarian intervention. Moreover, while a new precedent of 
ex post facto authorisation may have developed, the intervention in Liberia fails to 
provide clear evidence that humanitarian interventions, without the consent of the 
State government, were developing into a norm. Therefore, humanitarian 
intervention remains lacking in the requisite state practice and opinio juris. 
Northern Iraq 
Following Iraq’s defeat in the Gulf War of 1991, Kurdish groups living in 
Northern Iraq rebelled against the State, seeking independence.
102
 In retaliation, 
by March 1991 President Saddam Hussein’s regime had attacked Kurdish villages 
with the use of combat helicopters.
103
 ‘An estimated one million refugees 
attempted to flee to Turkey,
104
 with ‘hundreds of thousands of peaceful 
inhabitants, including women, the elderly and children, barefoot and hungry … 
fleeing … along snow-covered mountain paths under artillery fire and 
bombardments’.105 
In response to growing fears that instability in the region and mass refugee 
populations would threaten international peace and security, and the escalation of 
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tensions between Iraq and Iran,
106
 the Security Council adopted Resolution 688. 
The Resolution condemned Iraqi violence against the Kurdish population,
107
 
demanded the immediate ‘end [of] this repression’,108 and insisted upon the Iraqi 
government and army allowing humanitarian organisations ‘immediate access … 
to all those in need of assistance’.109 As Gordon notes, Resolution 688 was narrow 
in its scope by ‘not authoris[ing] the Security Council to use force to protect 
human rights … contain[ed] no reference to Chapter VII’ and ‘fail[ed] to mention 
collective enforcement measures’.110 Such failures can only be regarded as 
deliberate given that the Security Council had been willing to authorise 
intervention under Chapter VII only shortly before. Moreover, during Security 
Council meetings, the inclusion of broader terms supporting intervention, as 
advocated by France, was strongly opposed by China and the Soviet Union, with 
China threatening the use of its veto power.
111
 Regardless of such machinations, 
by the end of April 1991 troops from the United States, the United Kingdom, 
France, and the Netherlands had landed in Northern Iraq to enforce the provision 
of humanitarian aid and to protect newly set-up ‘safe havens’.112 The same 
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coalition had already established a no-fly zone
113
 on the basis that Resolution 688 
gave them legitimate power to do so.
114
  
There was little condemnation of the intervention of the United States and its 
coalition forces in Iraq.
115
 This has led some humanitarian interventionists to 
suggest that the intervention in Iraq could be considered a positive development 
towards the establishment of a humanitarian intervention doctrine.
116
 However, as 
Malanczuk observes, the failure of the Security Council to condemn the actions 
taken by the United States and its coalition ‘is not determinative because the veto 
can effectively block censure’.117  
While it is possible that the use of humanitarian justifications for the intervention 
in Iraq may have weakened the principle of non-intervention. However, the 
intervention in Kosovo would suggest that the principle of non-intervention did 
remain intact as the intervening States specifically noted that the intervention in 
Kosovo ‘was a unique situation sui generis in the region of the Balkans’,118 which 
should not be interpreted as constituting a precedent.
119
 The response to Kosovo 
would thus indicate that the prohibition against the threat or use of force was still 
intact at the time of the intervention in Kosovo, eight years later. Consequentially, 
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if the principle of non-intervention was intact in 1999, the intervention in Iraq 
failed to weaken the principle of non-intervention through an implicit recognition 
of humanitarian intervention.  
Sierra Leone 
Prior to 1997, Sierra Leone had faced multiple internal disturbances, leading to 
instability. Finally, in 1996, Sierra Leone held elections, resulting in Ahmad 
Kabbah being elected President;
120
 however, warring continued until, with the 
help of ECOWAS, the United Nations and various individual States, the Abidjan 
Accord was signed in November 1996.
121
 Peace was short-lived; at the end of 
May 1997, Revolutionary United Front (RUF) forces led by Johnny Paul 
Koromah, ‘took over government buildings and prisons in the capital’ in a coup 
against Kabbah.
122
 Shortly before fleeing to Guinea, Kabbah appealed both to 
Nigeria (whose peacekeeping troops were already within Sierra Leone as a result 
of the civil war),
123
 and ECOWAS to intervene, to end the violence being 
perpetrated by RUF forces and to restore his government.
124
 
Two days after the initial coup, and in accordance with Status of Forces 
Agreement (SOFA) obligations as well as in response to Kabbah’s appeal, Nigeria 
deployed further troops ‘to restore law and order’.125 After two months of 
fighting, Nigerian forces were joined by the Economic Community of West 
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African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) forces following ECOWAS 
‘officially mandat[ing] ECOMOG to enforce sanctions against the junta and 
restore law and order’.126 Shortly after ECOWAS’s imposition of sanctions and 
authorisation of ECOMOG implementation, the Security Council enforced its own 
embargoes and, in Resolution 1132, under Chapter VIII powers, authorised 
ECOWAS to be the enforcing agent.
127
 It was not until February1998 that 
ECOWAS authorised ECOMOG to use direct force against rebels.
128
 Throughout 
ECOMOG’s involvement in the intervention in Sierra Leone, the international 
community praised its role, with Security Council Resolution 1162 commending 
ECOMOG for ‘the important role they are playing in support of the objectives 
related to the restoration of peace and security’.129 
As in the case of Liberia, humanitarian interventionists claim ECOMOG’s actions 
and the commendation from the Security Council show direct support for 
humanitarian intervention.
130
 However, the interventions (both the initial Nigerian 
intervention and that of ECOMOG) find their legality not in humanitarian 
intervention but in consent, regional action, and treaty obligations. Nigeria’s 
intervention at the beginning of the conflict in Sierra Leone was prompted by their 
treaty obligations under SOFA Article 21(1)(1), which states ‘Nigerian Forces 
Assistance Group (NIFAG) shall have the right to apply force in the sustenance of 
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the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Sierra Leone’.131 Thus, 
as noted by Levitt, due the illegality of the coup, Nigeria was both obligated and 
justified in its intervention.
132
 Moreover, under the ECOWAS Revised Treaty 
1993, Nigeria was legally justified in intervening, as Article 58 provides that 
Member States ‘undertake to … co-operate with the Community in establishing 
and strengthening appropriate mechanisms for the timely prevention and 
resolution of intra-State … conflict’.133 Accordingly, though it may have resulted 
in the accomplishment of humanitarian objectives, the Nigerian intervention was 
not justified on humanitarian grounds but rather wholly upon legal grounds. 
In a similar vein, the ECOMOG intervention also finds justification in the consent 
given by Kabbah for it, and the legal ability for regional action. As noted by 
Österdahl, ‘foreign intervention by the ECOMOG had been invited by the 
democratically elected President of Sierra Leone and was thereby not without 
legal foundation’.134 In addition, as discussed in Chapter Two, consent is one of 
the three current exceptions to the prohibition on force.
135
 Further, in Security 
Council Resolution 1162 (1998) there was, as in the case of Liberia, no mention 
of an acceptance of the emergence of a humanitarian intervention principle; 
instead there was merely a commendation of the role which had ECOMOG 
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played.
136
 Indeed, the commendation may have served as an ex post facto 
authorisation of ECOMOG activity and would thus be more appropriately viewed 
as a means by which to justify the emergence of a principle of post-intervention 
authorisation in cases of regional action. Such a conclusion echoes the views 
previously espoused by both Österdahl
137
 and the Report of the International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty.
138
  
Kosovo 
As Vesel notes, ‘violence in Kosovo dates back over six hundred years’.139 
However, conflict between Kosovar Albanians and Serbs accelerated in 1989, 
when President Milošević140 encouraged tensions by lobbying for a single Serbian 
State,
141
 and removing Kosovo’s right to self-government.142 Years of repression, 
the failure of ‘non-violent measures to try to achieve their independence’,143 and 
omission from the Dayton Peace Accords,
144
 encouraged the formation of 
Kosovar guerrilla force, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA).
145
 In February 
1998, tensions boiled over when Serbian police began a military campaign against 
Albanian Kosovars, resulting in an armed response from the KLA.
146
 The Serbian 
campaign against Albanians ‘made no distinction between armed guerrillas and 
unarmed citizens’, attacking ‘whole villages’ and leaving a ‘quarter of a million 
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people … refugees’.147 In March 1998, the Security Council responded to the 
impending crisis with Resolution 1160. It condemned the attacks from both 
Serbian police and the KLA, implemented an arms embargo, and supported the 
conclusion of an agreement which afforded greater independence for Kosovo 
while maintaining the ‘territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’ 
(FRY).
148
 However, fighting continued, and in September 1998, the Security 
Council adopted Resolution 1199, which formally ‘affirm[ed] that the 
deterioration of the situation in Kosovo constitutes a threat to peace and security 
in the region’, as well as demanding that ‘all parties, groups and individuals 
immediately cease hostilities and maintain a ceasefire’ under Chapter VII.149 
Milošević’s resolve in continuing attacks against Albanian Kosovars, irrespective 
of continued Security Council calls for the respect of human rights, resulted in 
NATO suggesting more forceful measures to end the conflict.
150
 In addition, the 
United States Secretary of State Madeleine Albright referred to NATO’s 
willingness, if necessary, to engage in the use of force against the FRY.
151
 Five 
days later, NATO authorised ‘‘limited air strikes and a phased air campaign’, a 
decision taken on the basis that ‘Yugoslavia ha[d] still not complied fully with 
UNSCR 1199’.152 The NATO threat to carry out air strikes worked and soon 
‘diplomatic efforts to resolve the Kosovo crisis intensified’, resulting in the FRY’s 
                                                 
147
 HC Deb 19 October 1998, vol 317, col 953. 
148
 UNSC Res 1160 (1998) (31 March 1998) UN Doc S/RES/1160 (1998), [5]. 
149
 UNSC Res 1199 (1998) (23 September 1998) UN Doc S/RES/1199 (1998), 2.  
150
 S Wheatley, ‘The NATO Action against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia: Humanitarian 
Intervention in the Post-Cold War Era’ [1999] 50 Northern Irish Legal Quarterly 478 (Wheatley), 
480.  
151
 M Albright, ‘Press Conference by US Secretary of State Albright’ (8 October 1998).  
152
 Secretary General NATO, ‘Statement to the Press Following Decision on the ACTORD’ (13 
October 1998) available at <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1998/s981013a.htm> accessed 28 
August 2013. 
78 
 
agreement to both an air and ground Verification Mission to ensure compliance 
with Resolution 1199.
153
 The Security Council subsequently endorsed the 
agreements in Resolution 1203 and demanded that the FRY ‘cooperate fully with 
the OSCE Verification Mission in Kosovo and the NATO Air Verification 
Mission over Kosovo’.154 However, by January 1999, violence within Kosovo had 
resumed, with the slaughter of Albanian Kosovars in Račak.155 
 In a final attempt to reach a peace agreement, the Rambouillet conference was 
held in France in February and March 1999. However, as noted by Vesel, the 
introduction of non-negotiable terms which provided for NATO free access in the 
FRY seemed ‘designed to ensure that no agreement would be reached’.156 This is 
supported by the fact that an aide to the United States Secretary of State 
Madeleine Albright stated the negotiations in Rambouillet ‘had only one purpose: 
to get the war started with the Europeans locked in’.157 Milošević refused to sign 
the accord, paving the way for NATO, on 24
th
 March 1999, to determine that ‘all 
efforts to achieve a negotiated, political solution to the Kosovo crisis ha[d] failed’, 
leaving no alternative ‘but to take military action’.158 
NATO’s unilateral decision to undertake air strikes against the FRY was met with 
mixed reactions; China, Russia, Belarus, and India strongly opposed NATO’s 
intervention, labelling it ‘a blatant violation of the United Nations Charter’ which 
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‘seriously exacerbat[ed] the situation in the Balkan region’.159 Though the 
BRIC
160
 nations subsequently attempted to pass a condemnatory resolution, it 
failed. This was unsurprising given that three of the five permanent members were 
part of NATO, with only two States, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands,
161
 
proposing that the air strikes were legal due to humanitarian necessity.
162
 Unlike 
Liberia and Sierra Leone, justification for the intervention could not be based 
upon the consent to, or a request for, action from the government of the State. In 
addition, the Security Council, while stopping a resolution condemning the 
intervention, failed to commend the intervention as it had previously done for the 
action taken by ECOMOG.  
Though the United Kingdom’s Foreign Affairs Select Committee found that 
several of the Security Council’s actions could ‘properly be interpreted as 
supportive of the NATO allies’ position’, there was no outright commendation.163 
Thus, the argument that NATO’s actions were authorised ex post facto cannot 
succeed.
164
 However, both the United States and France, along with NATO 
Secretary General Solana,
165
 advanced legal justifications for the intervention on 
the basis that the NATO intervention had been given implied authorisation 
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through the adoption of Resolutions 1160 and 1199.
166
 Such justification suggests 
that, at the very least, two of the States involved in the NATO action lacked the 
necessary opinio juris when it came to the possibility of humanitarian 
intervention.
167
 While the United Kingdom relied upon humanitarian intervention 
as a justification for the intervention, the Foreign Affairs Select Committee 
accepted ‘that no right of humanitarian intervention was contained in the 
Charter’,168 stating that ‘Operation Allied Force was contrary to the specific terms 
of what might be termed the basic law of the international community’.169 
Moreover, while ‘most other non-NATO members recognised the moral 
legitimacy of the action, [they] regretted the resort to unauthorised use of 
force’,170 the German Foreign Minister noted the intervention was ‘only justified 
in this special situation, [and] must not set a precedent for weakening the UN 
Security Council’s monopoly on authorising the use of legal international 
force’.171  
The Rio Group
172
 also expressed concern, noting that it ‘regret[ted] the recourse 
to the use of force in the Balkan region in contravention of the provisions of … 
the Charter of the United Nations’ and called for ‘respect for … the territorial 
integrity of States’.173 States’ general reluctance to afford any legality to the 
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intervention thus resulted in there being ‘no signs of an emerging opinio juris … 
in the aftermath of NATO’s war that unauthorised humanitarian intervention is 
under certain circumstances lawful’.174 It is for these reasons that ‘NATO’s 
bombing campaign has been widely stamped, by independent commissions as 
well as distinguished legal scholars, as a violation of international law’.175 
Conclusion 
In order for custom to be created both ‘extensive and virtually uniform’ State 
practice and evidence of opinio juris must be present.
176
 What is apparent from 
examining interventions both before and after 1990 is that there is neither 
extensive nor uniform State practice. Furthermore, States exhibit a clear lack of 
opinio juris in relation to humanitarian intervention, frequently citing other, more 
conventional customary justifications. The interventions between the inception of 
the United Nations Charter in 1945 and the end of the Cold War in 1990 were 
generally single-State and unilateral. Most States justified their actions on the self-
defence right to protect nationals abroad, such as in the Belgian intervention in 
Congo,
177
 the United States intervention in the Dominican Republic,
178
 and the 
United States intervention in Grenada.
179
 It is acknowledged that, in all these 
instances, attention was drawn to humanitarian crises or human rights violations 
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within the State. However, while an intervention based on the legal grounds of the 
protection of nationals abroad is justifiable as self-defence, that does preclude the 
intervention also having the subsidiary aim of improving humanitarian conditions 
within the State. It is evident, therefore, from State practice before 1990, that 
States made every effort not to rely on humanitarian grounds for intervention, 
even going so far as to use dubious legal grounds, such as those put forward by 
Vietnam, for justification in order to avoid such a reliance.
180
 The refusal to 
provide humanitarian grounds as legal justification shows that States did not 
believe that there was any legal basis for humanitarian interventions. Thus, there 
is ‘very little evidence to support assertions that a new principle of customary law 
legitimating humanitarian intervention … crystallised’ during the period between 
1945 and 1990.
181
 
Interventions after 1990 similarly fail to demonstrate cohesive State practice. 
However, unlike the interventions that occurred before 1990, those which took 
place thereafter were characterised by being coalitions of the willing or regional 
bodies. As a result, different justifications for the interventions were advanced. In 
both ECOMOG cases, consent from the affected State’s government had been 
obtained prior to intervention and intervention was taken in the form of regional 
action. A failure to obtain Security Council authorisation prior to intervention, and 
the subsequent commendation of interventions by the Security Council, led to the 
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possibility that a new custom relating to implied or ex post facto regional 
intervention had been created.
182
 Irrespective of whether procedural changes 
became custom, humanitarian intervention still failed to find support amongst 
States when justifying intervention. Indeed, with regard to both Northern Iraq and 
Kosovo, States chose to rely on extending the meaning of Security Council 
resolutions, which obviously did not authorise intervention, rather than on 
humanitarian grounds.  
Finally, while the intervention in Kosovo is the most likely of all the interventions 
to suggest that humanitarian intervention was gaining recognition as a legal 
principle, the reality is that States, while accepting the legitimacy of the 
intervention on moral grounds,
183
 refused to accept that it was legal, referring to 
their deep concerns that it was carried out without Security Council 
authorisation.
184
 Indeed, even States which supported the intervention recognised 
that it was of an exceptional nature,
185
 and thus not to be considered as creating 
precedent. The repeated comments by intervening States that Kosovo was a 
‘unique situation’186 suggests that they recognised that (despite the intervention) 
the prohibition on the threat and use of force remained a peremptory norm.
187
 
Moreover, even after the intervention in Kosovo, there was a ‘lack of broad 
international consensus’ concerning humanitarian intervention, which ‘shows that 
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Kosovo did not meet the State practice requirement, and weakens any claims that 
the Kosovo situation be used as precedent for legalising future interventions’.188  
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        Chapter Five: The Responsibility to Protect 
The Responsibility to Protect 
Introduction 
Throughout the interventions of the latter half of the twentieth century, there was 
a general lack of ‘state practice … sufficient to conclude … that the right to use 
force for humanitarian reasons has become part of customary international law’.1 
However, the crisis in Kosovo illustrated that, while States were not willing to 
accept a right of unilateral intervention on humanitarian grounds, they did accept 
that in certain extreme situations there existed some form of moral imperative to 
attempt to avoid humanitarian crises.
2
 It was upon this basis that Kofi Annan, 
United Nations Secretary-General at the time of the Kosovo crisis, asked, ‘if 
intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we 
respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica?’.3 Annan did not, however, refute that 
sovereignty was an important principle in international law, stating ‘the principles 
of sovereignty and non-interference offer vital protection to small and weak 
states’.4 Rather, he highlighted that there was a conflict between what a morally 
conscious society should do in the face of genocide within the bounds of 
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protecting sovereignty.
5
 Recognising that the problem of how to respond to mass 
atrocities was one that needed a comprehensive answer, the Canadian Government 
established the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 
(ICISS). After international consultation the ICISS published the Responsibility to 
Protect Report which catalogued both the history and problems of the concept of 
humanitarian intervention and provided a suggested alternative. 
This chapter will examine the responsibility to protect and the initial international 
reaction in response to the responsibility to protect doctrine. In so doing the 
chapter first will analyse the six principles of the responsibility to protect in order 
to determine the framework within which interventions should take place. 
Thereafter, the foundations, which rely on a responsibility as opposed to a right of 
intervention, will be examined. Finally, the consequent international reception of 
the principle will be analysed, with specific reference to the 2005 World Summit 
and subsequent declarations of agreement or inclusion of the principle in policy.  
Principles of the Responsibility to Protect 
In creating the responsibility to protect, the ICISS developed six principles to be 
considered before the implementation of any form of military intervention.
6
 The 
principles have been mooted by academics with regard to humanitarian 
intervention,
7
 and hitherto with regard ,to the just war theory.
8
 The principles have 
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been used in the past to create frameworks for humanitarian interventions with 
little international success.
9
 However, as the responsibility to protect depends on 
Security Council authorisation, the framework is more able to be implemented 
through oversight. The successful adoption of the six principles is contingent upon 
their being adopted as a whole, as each principle relies upon the other to ensure 
interventions were both legal and legitimate; reliance upon the principles as a 
whole would further remove the common concerns relating to humanitarian 
intervention of abuse, lack of clear thresholds and oversight.
10
 
Just Cause Threshold 
The “just cause threshold”11 was developed by the ICISS to limit the occasions on 
which military intervention could be used to only the most serious humanitarian 
crises. Originally, under the ICISS principle, military intervention was allowable 
only where action was necessary to prevent or stop 
large scale loss of life, actual or apprehended, with 
genocidal intent or not … [or] large scale “ethnic 
cleansing”, actual or apprehended, whether carried 
out by killing, forced expulsion, acts of terror or 
rape.
12
  
The threshold, however, was amended at the 2005 World Summit, when States 
unanimously agreed the threshold should be limited to ‘only four specified crimes 
and violations: genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
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humanity’.13 A high just cause threshold was set in an attempt to prevent the 
responsibility to protect being used for situations which might have fallen under 
the broad concept of humanitarian intervention, such as ‘intervention[s] to restore 
democracy, or to end human rights violations … [or] the overthrow of oppressive 
governments’.14 Maintaining distance from the ‘old’ concept of humanitarian 
intervention was important for weaker States which remembered ‘the long pattern 
of abuse by Western colonial powers in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, and by both sides during the Cold War’15 and were concerned that such 
practices would be adopted again.
16
 The four crimes are based on ‘relatively well-
defined standards’, allowing States to be held accountable when either action is 
proposed in a circumstance which does not meet the criteria, or when action is 
rejected in circumstances clearly meeting the criteria.
17
 Thus, the threshold 
provides smaller States with greater assurances that the responsibility to protect 
will not be abused.
18
 In addition, the responsibility to protect falls in line with the 
general international consensus after the crisis in Kosovo, which was that military 
force should only be used in the most ‘extreme cases of major harm to civilians’.19  
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In order to find that the just cause threshold for military intervention has been 
met, reliable evidence must be provided to the Security Council to validate a 
claim that one of the four crimes is or is about to be committed (genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity).
20
 Evidence of the 
commission of least one of the four crimes helps both to prevent States embarking 
upon interventions based ‘essentially [upon] matter[s] of interests, power and 
dominance’21 and to reduce the possibility of protracted debates in the Security 
Council aimed at determining, with very little proof, whether circumstances 
qualify as one of the four proscribed crimes.
22
 The ICISS Report suggested 
evidence could take the form of reports gathered by ‘universally respected and 
impartial non-government source[s]’, such as the International Committee for the 
Red Cross or pre-existing human rights bodies, such as the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees, which have greater capacities to track events within 
States.
23
 Apart from the use of these two bodies, the Secretary-General could 
utilise his powers to despatch independent fact-finding missions or seek evidence 
from alternative sources.
24
 The broad range of sources for evidence enables a 
more comprehensive ability to determine the type of hostilities being perpetrated 
in a State, consequently providing assurances for States wary of abuse. As noted 
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by the Secretary-General in his report Responsibility to Protect: Timely and 
Decisive Response, the inclusion ‘of a narrow but deep’ approach to the 
responsibility to protect allows for safety in the restrictive interpretation of the 
threshold for military action. Further, it would encourage the use of a variety of 
‘Charter-based tools’ in both identifying and responding to crises.25 Moreover, the 
requirement for ‘fair and accurate information’26 to be obtained and provided for 
Security Council debate encourages interventions only where there is the ‘right 
intention’.27 
Right Intention  
Arend and Beck claim that the concern that ‘powerful states will abuse … a 
doctrine’28 of humanitarian intervention has been confirmed, with examples of 
States suggesting a humanitarian aim only to intervene subsequently, based on 
their own interests.
29
 In addressing such apprehensions, the ICISS required that 
States which seek to intervene must demonstrate the intention to alleviate the 
suffering of those who are subjected to one of the four previously mentioned 
crimes.
30
 Determining the true intentions of a State before intervention is 
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extremely difficult; usually a State’s ulterior motives may become obvious only 
after intervention has taken place.
31
 As a result, the ICISS suggested ensuring that 
the right intention is present in two distinct ways. First, the ICISS recommends 
ensuring that military interventions ‘always tak[e] place on a collective or 
multilateral rather than single-country basis’.32 Secondly, the right intention can 
be more likely if it is clear that the collective body of the Security Council is ‘the 
sole arbiter of military interventions for human protection purposes’.33  
That humanitarian purposes will not always be the sole motivation behind 
encouraging or participating in an intervention has therefore been recognised by 
the ICISS.
34
 By using the Security Council as the sole authority for regulating 
intervention on this basis, it becomes more likely that intervention will 
predominantly focus on humanitarian objectives.
35
 The use of the Security 
Council, and the collective debates which are inherent in Security Council 
deliberations, mean that, in the event humanitarian purposes are only a subsidiary 
purpose of the proposed intervention, the intervention will be abandoned.
36
 
Instead, it will be replaced with ‘equally plausible but different solutions’ which 
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obtain humanitarian objectives, while disallowing access upon intervention on 
purely self-interested grounds.
37
 
Last Resort 
The ICISS acknowledged that military intervention can only be considered when 
it is the last resort possible to end an atrocity or prevent one that is impending.
38
 
The ICISS, and subsequently both the Secretary-General
39
 and the High-Level 
Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change,
40
 emphasised the importance of ‘every 
diplomatic and non-military avenue for the prevention or peaceful resolution of 
the humanitarian crisis … be[ing] explored’ before military intervention takes 
place.
41
 Moreover, even where diplomatic measures fail, first recourse should be 
made to more peaceful, and less inflammatory, methods, such as the use of 
ceasefires, international monitoring agreements, UN peacekeeping forces, 
observers and the provision of humanitarian assistance.
42
 Although, as Abiew 
notes, there is no expectation that in every situation all ‘option[s] must literally 
have been exhausted’. 43 Instead, there is an understanding that it would only be 
acceptable to assess the probable success of more peaceable measures where ‘the 
threat is massive and the situation is rapidly deteriorating’.44 The importance of 
the principle of last resort can be seen when applied to Kosovo. As was noted in 
the previous chapter, at the time of intervention, ethnic cleansing within Kosovo 
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had not begun
45
 and killings within the State, while numerous, had not yet reached 
horrific proportions.
46
 Given that the violence within Kosovo had not yet reached, 
nor was expected imminently, the level of humanitarian catastrophe, negotiations 
at Rambouillet could have continued with the NATO and Organization for 
Security and Co-operation in Europe Verification Missions
47
 monitoring violence 
levels.
48
 Instead, negotiation attempts were abandoned for the use of force, which 
ultimately resulted in further killing on a larger scale.
49
  
Proportional Means and Reasonable Prospects 
The proportionality of any authorised intervention is the key to ensuring that the 
responsibility to protect remains legitimate.
50
 Proportionality does not allow either 
the annihilation of State infrastructure, as occurred in both Kosovo
51
 and Iraq,
52
 or 
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the use of force greater than that necessary to prevent or end an humanitarian 
crisis. In international law the principle of proportionality ‘relates to the size, 
duration and target’ of the use of force where the aim ‘should be to halt or repel an 
attack’.53 The principle is also codified in the Geneva Conventions 1949: Protocol 
I of the Geneva Conventions 1949 relating to the Protection of Victims of 
International Armed Conflicts 1977 prohibits  
an attack which may be expected to cause incidental 
loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to 
civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which 
would be excessive in relation to the concrete and 
direct military advantage anticipated.
54
 
Conventions I,
55
 II,
56
 and IV
57
 define ‘extensive destruction and appropriation of 
property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and 
wantonly’ as grave breaches.58 In applying proportionality to self-defence, the 
International Court of Justice found in Military and Paramilitary Activities in and 
against Nicaragua that a use of force is proportionate where the action is 
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proportionate to the threat posed.
59
 Further, in Oil Platforms, the Court found that, 
when determining whether an action is proportionate, the nature of the target must 
be considered,
60
 as well as the scale of the whole operation.
61
 The purpose of 
including the principle of proportionality is to ensure that where military 
interventions take place the ‘least onerous measure’62 with the ‘minimum 
necessary’ amount of force for attaining the ‘humanitarian objective in question’63 
is utilised. 
Similar to the principle of proportionality prior to intervention, there must be a 
reasonable prospect of the intervention succeeding in its humanitarian objective.
64
 
Thus, the intervention would be approved only where the means would not do 
greater harm than is necessary to attain the legitimate objective. This results in the 
ICISS conclusion that, in certain ‘case[s] … some human beings simply cannot be 
rescued except at unacceptable cost[s]’.65 In applying this principle to the conflict 
in Kosovo it is likely that greater emphasis would have been given to the use of 
peaceful methods of resolution. This is supported by the fact that NATO forces 
were aware that Milošević’s forces were likely to undertake the retaliatory 
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measure of ethnic cleansing, which resulted in a sharp increase in casualties in the 
Kosovo conflict.
66
  
Right Authority 
The ICISS recognised that there are very few exceptions to the general prohibition 
of the threat or use of force under Article 2(4).
67
 In light of this, the Report did not 
expand the limits on the use of force, citing the existing power of the Security 
Council, under Chapter VII, to authorise military intervention and the exception 
under Article 51.
68
 Consequentially, the ICISS accepted that only when actions 
are taken through the United Nations can they gain both legality and legitimacy 
under international law, as such action will have been ‘duly authorised by a 
representative international body’.69 In support of Security Council authorisation 
the report reaffirmed that the United Nations, as an institution, reminds States of 
their obligations to refrain from certain actions.
70
 However, the report also 
acknowledged concerns over the ability of both the United Nations and the 
Security Council to fulfil their positions properly as an international collective 
security system.
71
 Accepting that there have been problems with the United 
Nations working as an effective body due to problems of political will, veto 
power, uneven representation, and performance, the report further stated that, 
regardless of past inconsistencies, the United Nations,
72
 and the Security Council 
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in particular, is the best and most appropriate international body to cope with 
humanitarian-based military interventions.
73
 
The ICISS suggested three ways in which the impediments to effective Security 
Council actions could be surmounted, as well as possible alternatives where the 
Security Council,
74
 for whatever reason, failed to act.
75
 The first proposal 
submitted that the five permanent members agree to a ‘code of conduct’ regarding 
the use of their veto power in circumstances relating to actions to prevent or halt 
humanitarian crises.
76
 A code of conduct would establish that permanent members 
would not utilise their veto power (or threaten its use)
77
 where a majority 
resolution would otherwise be obtained.
78
 However, as noted by Payandeh, the 
likelihood of any form of restriction on the use of the veto power by permanent 
members is limited;
79
 this is supported by the fact that in the period between 1966 
and 2007 the United States and the United Kingdom vetoed more resolutions than 
China, France and Russia combined.
80
 
Secondly, the ICISS proposed using the pre-existing ‘Uniting for Peace’ 
procedures.
81
 Under Uniting for Peace, where the  
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Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the 
permanent members, fails to exercise its primary 
responsibility for the maintenance of international 
peace and security in any case where there appears to 
be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of 
aggression…82 
the matter may be considered by the General Assembly.
83
 While the General 
Assembly has no legal power to authorise action, Schorlemer advocates that the 
General Assembly adopting a resolution in favour of action would ‘accurately 
reflect the will of the international community’, thus giving any resultant action 
legitimacy.
84
 Certainly, as Schorlemer argues, a General Assembly resolution 
passed with at least a two thirds majority
85
 could be considered more 
representative of international opinion than the veto of a Security Council 
resolution on the basis of a single vote.
86
 Though the use of Uniting for Peace 
would still ensure that any possible action would have received some form of 
approval from the United Nations, any resultant intervention would not fulfil the 
legal requirement of Security Council authorisation. Furthermore, it is difficult to 
see how the implementation and monitoring of any subsequent intervention would 
occur if “authorised” through the General Assembly.  
The final proposal recommended that collective intervention could be executed by 
regional organisations such as ECOWAS.
87
 The role of regional organisations in 
the maintenance of international peace and security is recognised under Article 52 
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of the Charter.
88
 Furthermore, regional organisations have previously been 
suggested to be the best ‘equipped to deal with inter-state conflicts’, as they have a 
greater understanding of the unique ‘economic, political, and resource-related 
concerns’ of the area89 and can undertake action ‘more efficiently’.90 In turn, some 
support has been given to the idea that ex post facto authorisation would retain the 
legality and legitimacy of non-Security Council authorised actions. However, 
given that on only two occasions has there been a clear commendation of such 
operations, the existence of such a principle in the form of custom is debatable, for 
it has not found ‘wide international favour’.91 The ICISS nevertheless states that 
such action is appropriate only where the action taken by a regional organisation is 
against a member from within its area of membership, unlike, for instance, the 
NATO intervention in Kosovo.
92
 Where Security Council action is prevented due 
to deadlock, the ICISS noted that, although action taken without authorisation may 
‘damage … [the] international order’, greater harm may be done ‘if human beings 
are slaughtered while the Security Council stands by’.93 However, Bellamy posits, 
an endorsement of guidelines providing for intervention without Security Council 
authorisation was highly unlikely to occur, especially given extant concerns over 
abuse.
94
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Thus, while alternatives to Security Council authorised action are provided by the 
ICISS, there is also an acceptance that finding a general consensus on action taken 
without Security Council authorisation would be difficult.
95
 Further, Evans and 
Sahnoun observed that, regardless of the success of any subsequent mission, the 
failure of the Security Council to authorise and provide a response to the 
humanitarian crisis would ‘have enduringly serious consequences for the stature of 
the UN itself’; thus, the ‘UN cannot afford to drop the ball too many times on that 
scale’.96  
Foundation of the Responsibility to Protect 
Like the foundation of humanitarian intervention, the responsibility to protect is 
founded on the basic principle that citizens provide a State with its sovereignty in 
return for the State’s acceptance of certain responsibilities.97 As in humanitarian 
intervention, the responsibility to protect acknowledges that States have the 
responsibility of ensuring that their citizens are safe, and protected ‘from 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity’.98 However, 
unlike humanitarian intervention, there is no “loss” of sovereignty in the event 
that a State fails to protect citizens from, or wilfully subjects them to, large-scale 
loss of life or ethnic cleansing.
99
 Accordingly, instead of States losing their right 
to non-intervention and the international community gaining the right to 
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intervene, the responsibility to protect advocates all States having responsibilities, 
first to their citizens, and secondly (in the event of a State failing in those 
responsibilities) to the citizens of other States.
100
 The removal of the concept of 
States “losing” their sovereignty means that there is more of an emphasis on 
‘help[ing] States fulfil the[ir] responsibilities’ than on simply using force to 
rectify the situation.
101
 This is because the international community no longer 
gains a ‘right to intervene’; this removes both the ‘intrinsically more 
confrontational’102 language and the focus upon one State, usually ‘large and 
powerful ones … throw[ing] their weight around militarily’.103 Instead, States are 
encouraged to use a ‘wide spectrum of proactive measures and assistance to local 
government in discharging their responsibility’104 by ‘us[ing] appropriate 
diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means … to help protect 
populations’.105 The focus on assisting States where they fail in their 
responsibilities is encompassed in the inclusion not only of a responsibility to 
protect but also a responsibility to prevent atrocities from occurring in the first 
place and rebuild States where interventions have taken place. By doing so the 
strict ‘focus on military force’ is removed and extended to ‘other tools for 
protection’.106 
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The move towards responsibilities had previously taken place in the 1948 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
(Genocide Convention) which enunciated the duty States have to prevent and 
punish genocide.
107
 The extent of the responsibility was confirmed in the Case 
Concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment 
of the Crime of Genocide.
108
 The International Court of Justice found that Article 
1 of the Genocide Convention required any State which ‘learns of, or should 
normally have learned of, the existence of a serious risk that genocide will be 
committed’109 to use the means available to it to try to prevent the perpetration of 
the genocide, regardless of whether the intended genocide were to occur within 
the State’s own territory or another’s.110 Further, in the Articles on Responsibility 
of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, it is confirmed that the international 
community ‘shall cooperate to bring to an end … any serious breach’.111 Thus, 
where a State fails in their international obligations, it is not solely the 
responsibility of the failing State to attempt to end the breach, but the 
responsibility of the international community as a whole.  
The responsibility to protect, unlike humanitarian intervention, does not create its 
own obligations, but builds upon pre-existing obligations within international 
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humanitarian law, international conventions, custom, and human rights.
112
 
Accordingly, the principle changes the manner in which States end humanitarian 
crises in other States by first encouraging the international community to help 
failing States fulfil their responsibilities, before moving to collective action, 
reinforcing the importance of action taken through the United Nations.
113
 The 
responsibility to protect is therefore an enforcement doctrine of pre-existing 
obligations with principles to encourage implementation.
114
 
International Response to the Responsibility to Protect 
Initial reactions to the responsibility to protect were, predominantly, positive,
115
 
with many Security Council members responding favourably.
116
 However, four of 
the five permanent members ‘expressed disquiet with the idea of formalising 
criteria for intervention’, which would, in their eyes, result in States having a 
greater ability to conduct interventions.
117
 The 2003 invasion of Iraq did little to 
ameliorate existing concerns. Rather, it ‘undermin[ed] global acceptance’ due to 
the suggestion of the invasion being ‘a good example of the responsibility to 
protect principle at work’ by the intervening States, when it was largely seen as 
unwarranted intervention in the foreign affairs of another State.
118
 Concerns over 
the ‘blatant manipulation of a humanitarian justification in order to sanction the 
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recourse to force’119 heightened existent fears relating to the responsibility to 
protect. This resulted in a chilling effect around the principle and, as Evans notes, 
‘almost choked R2P at its birth’.120 Even States which had previously supported 
the responsibility to protect became less vigorous in their endorsements of the 
principle and were less willing to ask for other States to accept the range of new 
proposals within the ICISS report.
121
 Such fears over future misuse of the 
responsibility to protect were, as suggested by Byers, the principal reasons for 
previous supporters of the responsibility to protect accepting a vastly weaker 
doctrine, which was neither broad in terms nor far-reaching.
122
  
Though both the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change
123
 and the 
Secretary-General supported the adoption of the responsibility to protect with 
relatively few amendments to the original report, proposals by States, including 
the United States,
124
 resulted in much of the core doctrine of the responsibility to 
protect being removed.
125
 This included the removal of the proposal to encourage 
permanent members to abstain from the use of veto power and the inclusion of a 
collectively-determined criterion for determining when to act.
126
 During the 
General Assembly debates, States aired concerns that the United Nations, in 
adopting anything other than a diluted form of the doctrine, would be heading 
down an ‘interventionist path’ with ‘big and powerful States, not small and 
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weaker ones, decid[ing] where and when to intervene to protect people at risk’.127 
As Berman and Michaelson noted, the changes ‘damag[ed] the legal utility of the 
doctrine’ which did little more than ‘affir[m] a restrained notion of responsibility 
largely devoid of normative value’.128 Thus, while the responsibility to protect 
was, in theory, unanimously adopted, the ‘negotiations of the provisions … 
related to the responsibility to protect cannot provide evidence for the exceptional 
intention of member states to lay down a legal provision’.129 There is no evidence, 
however, that the operational framework of the responsibility to protect has been 
adopted by the international community, other than a broad responsibility to 
consider action on a ‘case by case basis’.130 Moreover, the international 
endorsement of the responsibility to protect focussed on emphasising that 
responsibility for the protection of citizens rests predominantly with their State, 
and only secondarily with the international community.
 131
 Therefore, despite its 
proclamations, the General Assembly failed ‘to endorse a legally binding’ 
doctrine.
132
 
Since the 2005 World Summit there has been some international support for the 
responsibility to protect. The responsibility to protect was mentioned in both the 
Security Council and General Assembly after the 2005 Summit. However, such 
statements generally reiterated the same themes as in the Outcome Document, 
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noting: the need to ‘preven[t] the occurrence of armed conflict’; that ‘the primary 
responsibility of States [is] to protect their own citizens’; the need for the ‘United 
Nations to tak[e] a lead in ensuring that the perpetrators of abuses against civilians 
are brought to justice’; and ‘the importance of a coherent, unified approach by the 
Council … in all … peacekeeping operations’.133  
The responsibility to protect was referred to in the resolution prior
134
 to 
Resolution 1769, which authorised the Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) to 
use force in Darfur for protecting civilians.
135
 However, while the responsibility to 
protect was mentioned in Resolution 1769’s preamble, it did not feature in the 
operational part of the resolution. Moreover, alongside the reiteration of the 
responsibility to protect, was the confirmation of the importance of respecting the 
‘sovereignty, unity, independence and territorial integrity of Sudan’, which 
implies that although the Security Council had endorsed the responsibility to 
protect, the importance of sovereignty was still supreme.
136
 The failure to include 
any mention of the responsibility to protect was a notable omission in the 
resolution which authorised UNAMID to use force to protect civilians.
137
 Consent 
by the Sudanese government to the provision of UNAMID forces also suggests 
that the role which the responsibility to protect played in any humanitarian effort 
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in Darfur was limited.
138
 Bellamy argues that the responsibility to protect was also 
implemented in the violence which erupted in Kenya following the 2007 
elections.
139
 It is true that the Secretary-General mentioned the responsibility to 
protect in addressing violence in Kenya;
140
 however, the only reference to the 
responsibility to protect was in relation to the responsibility of the ‘Government, 
as well as the political and religious leaders of Kenya … to protect the lives of 
innocent people’.141 Such a statement does little to reinforce the responsibility of 
other States to protect the citizens of another State, as was proposed in the ICISS 
Report. Further mention of the responsibility to protect was made in regards to the 
escalating violence in the Côte d’Ivoire after the presidential elections of 2010.142 
However, as with Darfur, the responsibility to protect was included only in the 
preamble of the resolution, not the operative section.  
The Security Council reaffirmed ‘its strong commitment to the sovereignty, 
independence [and] territorial integrity … of the Côte d’Ivoire’ and recalled ‘the 
importance of the principl[e] of … non-interference’.143 Moreover, the only 
mention of the responsibility to protect was in specific reference to the Côte 
d’Ivoire’s responsibility to its own citizens, not the international community’s 
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responsibility.
144
 As such, the responsibility to protect, as in both Kenya and 
Darfur, played only a limited role in the resolution of violence within the State.  
Overall, international responses to the responsibility to protect have been mixed. 
Many States still fear that the responsibility to protect can be used to continue the 
bid for control by large States over smaller States.
145
 Additionally, the failure of 
many of the original suggestions in the ICISS report has resulted in the 
responsibility to protect becoming a vague doctrine supporting little other than the 
responsibility to protect one’s own citizens and the need for the international 
community to be able to respond in cases of dire humanitarian crises.
146
 The 
concerted efforts to strip the responsibility to protect of its proposals for the 
limitation of veto power, delimitation of guidelines for when intervention should 
be carried out, and the emphasis of a responsibility to protect nationals where their 
own State refuses or is incapable of doing so, has resulted in the dilution of the 
principle.
147
 Given this, the responsibility to protect has failed to develop into a 
norm in international law. Rather, it remains as merely a reiteration of pre-existing 
concepts with little effect on international principles.  
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                  Chapter Six: Libya and Why the Responsibility to Protect Does Not Work 
Libya and Why the Responsibility to Protect Does Not 
Work 
Introduction  
In 2005, the General Assembly came together at the World Summit and, for the 
first time, officially endorsed the concept of the responsibility to protect.
1
 While 
the responsibility to protect was unanimously adopted, the international response 
was mixed, as Chapter Five discussed. Most notably, the Non-Aligned Movement 
representatives expressed concern that the responsibility to protect would be 
‘misus[ed] to legitimize unilateral coercive measures or intervention in the 
internal affairs of States’.2 Moreover, the principle that the General Assembly 
endorsed was not that which had been outlined in the ICISS report. Instead, the 
majority of the framework which had been created by the ICISS was removed, 
leaving only the concept of responsibility.
3
 Thus, as noted by Hamilton, most of 
the central principles espoused by the ICISS ‘were lost in the transition from 
document to doctrine’.4 The Security Council’s subsequent limited use of the 
responsibility doctrine, and the failure of States to give it their full support, have 
resulted in limited chances for the responsibility to protect to be rebuilt and gain 
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greater international support.
5
 The World Summit endorsement of the 
responsibility to protect pledged to determine cases on a ‘case by case basis’, 
thereby removing any mention of the original ICISS guidelines for military 
intervention.
6
 This therefore negated the need for a minimum set of criteria before 
intervention and allowed States to be more selective.
7
 Accordingly, when the 
Libyan crisis began to take hold in 2011, there had been only limited use of the 
responsibility to protect within the Security Council and limited guidelines for 
when and how intervention should occur. It is upon this background that this 
chapter’s analysis of the Libyan intervention rests. 
This chapter first will outline the background to the Libyan crisis and the events 
leading up to the Security Council resolution authorising Chapter VII measures 
which resulted in NATO intervening under the auspices of the protection of 
civilians. Secondly, the reaction of the Security Council to the Libyan crisis will 
be examined, looking specifically at the intentions of States in adopting 
Resolution 1973 (2011). Thirdly, the NATO intervention itself will be analysed, 
with specific regard to the role NATO played in the removal of Gaddafi and in 
defeating Gaddafi’s troops. In concert with an analysis of NATO’s intervention, 
the scope of Resolution 1973 (2011) will be studied to determine whether the 
NATO intervention in Libya ultimately exceeded its Security Council mandate. 
Finally, the repercussions of the Libyan intervention will be discussed with 
specific reference to both the effects that the Libyan intervention has had on the 
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principle of the responsibility to protect, and Security Council action in regard to 
the crisis in Syria. The chapter concludes by suggesting that the NATO 
intervention, having exceeded its Security Council mandate, has done long-term 
damage to the principle of the responsibility to protect, leading to the reticence of 
permanent members of the Council in allowing similar intervention in Syria. This 
thesis contends that, by exceeding its mandate, NATO reaffirmed the concerns 
highlighted at the 2005 World Summit regarding the capacity for the 
responsibility to protect to be abused. 
Background to the Libyan Crisis 
The “Arab Spring” began a revolutionary wave of protest within the Middle East 
beginning in December 2010, following Mohamed Bouazizi’s self-immolation in 
Tunisia.
8
 Based mostly on political unrest, corruption, human rights abuses, and 
media restrictions, protesters took to the streets demanding change.
9
 It was against 
the backdrop of general civil unrest within the Middle East that the arrests of 
Jamal al-Hajji
10
 and the human rights activist, Fatih Turbel,
11
 sparked riots in 
Benghazi on 15
th
 February 2011. While the riots originally related to the arrest of 
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Turbel, they quickly became the beginning of a movement to remove Gaddafi 
from power.
12
 By the 27
th
 February protesters had gathered in armed opposition 
forces
13
 against the attempts by the security forces to quell the unrest,
14
 in the 
form of 100 to 300 separate armed forces,
15
 and began their slow movement 
towards taking control of Libyan cities.
16
 
Gaddafi’s response to calls for his resignation was one of retaliation, the 
reinforcement of existing security forces, and a declaration that the rebels would 
be defeated.
17
 In responding to the threat that the rebel forces posed, Gaddafi 
stated that such ‘cockroaches’18 would be ‘hunted down door-to-door and 
executed’,19 and that he would go ‘house to house’20 to do so. Gaddafi’s intentions 
became clearer with his drafting of mercenaries to engage in hostilities, the 
engagement of his troops in fighting with rebels, and the same forces’ 
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involvement in the ‘torture, murder, rape and the use of cluster bombs against 
civilians’.21 As Phillips notes, by the end of February 2011, ‘an intensification of 
the repressive tendencies that had always sustained the regime’22 had occurred and 
‘arbitrary arrests, forced disappearances [and] summary executions’23 became 
commonplace.  
Security Council Response to the Impending Libyan Crisis 
The international community’s concern about the hostilities taking place in Libya 
grew in response to Gaddafi’s continual pledges to ‘fight until the last man and 
woman’,24 and open encouragement of supporters to ‘come out of your homes. 
Attack [rebels] in their dens’.25 The Security Council unanimously adopted 
Resolution 1970 (2011) on 26
th
 February. The resolution deplored the Libyan 
government’s ‘incitement to hostility and violence against the civilian 
population’; recalled Libya’s ‘responsibility to protect its population’; welcomed 
the condemnation of the hostilities by the Arab League, African Union and 
Organization of the Islamic Conference; and considered the possibility that the 
‘widespread and systematic attacks currently taking place … may amount to 
crimes against humanity’.26 The Security Council acted further under Chapter VII 
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by demanding that an immediate end be brought to the violence occurring within 
the Libyan State;
27
 urged the allowance of humanitarian assistance;
28
 referred the 
hostilities taking place to the International Criminal Court for consideration;
29
 
imposed an arms embargo on Libya,
30
 as well as a travel ban upon selected 
members of the Gaddafi government and family;
31
 froze the assets of selected 
members of the Gaddafi government and family;
32
 and established a Sanctions 
Committee to monitor the implementation of the authorised measures.
33
  
The demands in Resolution 1970 (2011) were not adhered to by the Gaddafi 
government, which ‘rejected the demands … and refused to permit humanitarian 
aid convoys into besieged towns’.34 Indeed, in an act of defiance, the government 
increased the level of violence against civilians.
35
 Noting Gaddafi’s refusal, 
regional organisations began to call for further action to halt Gaddafi’s attacks. 
The Gulf Cooperation Council called for the Security Council to ‘take all 
necessary measures to protect civilians, including enforcing a no-fly zone over 
Libya’,36 and the Organization of the Islamic Conference called for the 
enforcement of a no-fly zone.
37
 Finally, on 12
th
 March 2011, the Arab League 
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made a plea to the Security Council that a no-fly zone be implemented in order to 
prevent further attacks against the Libyan civilian population.
38
 While the African 
Union condemned the actions of the Gaddafi government, it also remarked upon 
the ‘transformation of pacific demonstrations into an armed rebellion’, and thus 
rejected any form of foreign intervention as a violation of the unity and territorial 
integrity of Libya, as well as on the basis that it would only result in an escalation 
of violence within the State.
39
 While Resolution 1973 (2011) did allow for the use 
of ‘all necessary measures’ to protect civilians and civilian-populated areas, it did 
so without creating a single United Nations force to implement such measures. 
Instead, States merely had to notify the Secretary-General that they intended to act 
either ‘nationally or through regional organisations or arrangements’.40 In 
addition, there was no requirement upon States to inform the Secretary-General of 
the measures intended to be taken; rather, there was only a request so to do.
41
  
In response, France, Lebanon, the United Kingdom, and the United States tabled a 
draft resolution.
42
 The draft had several purposes: it reiterated Libya’s 
responsibility to protect its citizens,
43
 though not in the operational part of the 
resolution but in the preamble; demanded an immediate cease-fire;
44
 established a 
no-fly zone in Libyan airspace;
45
 reiterated the existing arms embargo;
46
 formed a 
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panel of experts, in addition to the Sanction Committee;
47
 and authorised member 
States to undertake ‘all necessary measures … to protect civilians and civilian 
populated areas under threat of attack’, though foreign occupation was excluded.48 
The draft resolution was subsequently adopted as Resolution 1973 (2011), but five 
members of the Security Council refused to support the resolution, abstaining 
from the vote.
49
  
While all States accepted that action had to be taken by the Security Council to 
address Gaddafi’s increased attempts to thwart rebel forces, the five abstaining 
States had concerns over the implementation of military action within Libya. 
Germany was concerned about the resultant effects of military intervention, both 
on the civilian population within Libya and surrounding areas,
50
 and Russia, India, 
and China voiced concerns over the lack of clear indication as to the manner or 
style of the ‘measures’ which could be taken and the format that the no-fly zone 
would take.
51
 Brazil was also concerned about the inclusion of a possible military 
intervention when regional organisations had called only for the implementation 
of a no-fly zone.
52
 However, the two permanent members,
53
 China and Russia, 
chose only to abstain rather than veto the resolution. Huang suggests that such 
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abstention may have been a result of other States applying the theory of ‘political 
and moral pressure’ to urge permanent members into not using their veto power 
for fear of humanitarian catastrophe.
54
 However, statements from China and 
Russia ‘regarding the clear unacceptability of the use of force against the civilian 
population’55 and the need to ‘halt acts of violence against civilians’ suggest 
otherwise.
56
 What becomes clear, as Williams and Bellamy claim, is that whilst 
both permanent members did not agree with the authorisation of the use of force, 
Gaddafi’s promises to ‘cleanse Libya house by house’57 left both States with a 
‘lack of good alternative policy options’ and the possibility of being labelled as 
the reason behind the Security Council’s failure to act in the face of a clear ‘threat 
of mass atrocities’.58 
Resolution 1973 (2011) Mandate and NATO Intervention 
On 18
th
 March 2011, a warning was issued by the Obama administration that 
unless Gaddafi implemented a cease-fire, removed loyalist forces from Libyan 
cities and halted any other troops’ progress, the United States would undertake a 
military intervention as authorised by Resolution 1973.
59
 In response to continued 
Libyan offensive operations, the United Kingdom, France, Canada and the United 
States began military strikes on 19
th
 March against Libyan ‘military airfields and 
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air defence systems to establish a no-fly zone’.60 However, soon after NATO took 
command of the Libyan intervention, international concerns began to arise that 
NATO was exceeding the mandate of Resolution 1973 (2011),
61
 due in part to the 
change in targets by NATO from military air fields and military installations to 
‘oil refineries, television stations and other civilian sites’.62 Herron argues that, by 
the end of the first week of NATO air strikes, the purpose of Resolution 1973 
(2011) had been achieved with ‘the possibility of a massacre of civilians in 
Benghazi … [having been] foreclosed’.63 The original mandate of Resolution 
1973 (2011) allowed for the use of ‘all necessary measures … to protect civilians 
and civilian populated areas under threat of attack’,64 which was also clear from 
the Security Council debates where the drafting States proposed that the intention 
behind military intervention was to prevent an imminent humanitarian disaster 
and the continued violence within Libya.
65
 The reasons given by the abstaining 
permanent members for their decision not to use their power of veto was that they 
had been assured that the intervention would not result in a ‘large-scale military 
intervention’ and that they were intent on ensuring that the civilian population 
would be protected.
66
 The objective of protecting only civilians adhered to the 
principle of impartiality which, as Pippan states, is a traditional United Nations 
principle and requires that, where intervention takes place, forces should be 
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neutral in the conflict.
67
 The same principle was implied in the ICISS report on 
the responsibility to protect, which specifically stated that objectives such as 
regime change were not acceptable purposes under humanitarian intervention.
68
 
Thus, it has been suggested, including by those who originally supported the 
intervention, that the actions taken by NATO forces, even within the first week of 
operations, went significantly further than that which was mandated in Resolution 
1973 (2011).
69
 
While the original enforcement of the no-fly zone by the Western coalition did 
conform to the conditions of the resolution, the subsequent NATO support of 
rebel forces exceeded the mandate, at times even contradicting the purpose of 
Resolution 1973 (2011). It should be noted that, upon NATO taking control of the 
intervention at the end of March, there still existed little communication between 
rebel forces and NATO command; as a result, in the first few days of the NATO 
intervention, rebel forces were the subjects of strikes on the basis that NATO had 
no knowledge of the locations of rebel forces.
70
 However, NATO personnel were 
soon sent to Libya to communicate with the rebel forces and provide ground 
information to NATO command; as such, rebel forces began to collect 
information, identify Gaddafi installations, and provide GPS coordinates to 
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NATO so that subsequent strikes could be made.
71
 To further the ability of the 
rebels to provide accurate information, NATO created a joint operations centre 
where NATO and rebel forces could ‘coordinate and make more effective the 
processing of military and tactical information back to NATO’.72 In addition, and 
in response to the rebel forces’ lack of training, arms and command structure,73 
several States involved in the NATO intervention provided equipment, personnel 
and training to the rebel forces.
74
 In late April 2011, the United Kingdom notified 
the Secretary-General that it intended to provide protective equipment and 
military advisers to the National Transitional Council, while Qatar and Saudi 
Arabia directly intervened on the ground by sending ‘hundreds of forces’ into 
Libya.
75
 In addition to the provision of training and materiel, NATO forces 
provided assistance to attacking rebel forces with air support, involving the use of 
both bombs and predator drones to fire at loyalist forces,.
76
 Such NATO measures 
were not authorised by the Security Council and were a violation of prohibition on 
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the use of force.
77
 That NATO’s intention had changed from the protection of 
civilians to the removal of the Gaddafi regime became obvious from statements 
made by NATO States shortly before command was turned over to NATO and 
after the change in command.
78
 Four days before NATO took complete control 
over the intervention, President Obama stated that ‘while our military mission is 
narrowly focused on saving lives, we continue to pursue the broader goal of a 
Libya that belongs not to a dictator, but to its people’.79 The proclamation of the 
United States that the overarching goal of the intervention was not the protection 
of civilians but the freeing of the Libyan State from Gaddafi control indicates that 
already, prior to NATO command, there was a deviation from original mandate of 
Resolution 1973 (2011).
80
 Moreover, once NATO had command control, France, 
the United Kingdom, and the United States stated that 
so long as Qaddafi is in power, NATO must 
maintain its operations so that civilians remain 
protected and the pressure on the regime builds 
[that] there is a pathway to peace … for the people 
of Libya – a future without Qaddafi [and that] 
Qaddafi must go and go for good.
81
  
Paradoxically, the coalition States recognised in the same statement that 
Resolution 1973 (2011) did not include the removal of Gaddafi by force.
82
 
Accordingly, NATO’s active cooperation with rebel forces and the clear 
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statements regarding the need to remove Gaddafi suggest that there was a distinct 
intention to participate in his removal.
83
 NATO’s deliberate targeting of convoys 
suspected to hold Gaddafi loyalists or members of the Gaddafi family is also 
evidence that NATO was no longer working within the Security Council mandate 
but directly intending to remove Gaddafi from power.
84
 The targeting of convoys 
fleeing areas of fighting would have done little to ameliorate a threat to civilians 
and, in some cases, actually resulted in the death of civilians.
85
  
In April 2011, South Africa suggested the implementation of a ceasefire and 
opening of a dialogue between rebel forces and Gaddafi.
86
 NATO responded by 
claiming that it was ‘too early’ to implement a ceasefire87 and made no attempt to 
support the creation of a conciliatory platform between the rebels and Gaddafi, 
even though Gaddafi had signalled agreement to participate in a mediation plan.
88
 
Given that the purpose of Resolution 1973 (2011) was to protect civilians, 
NATO’s refusal went against such a purpose. Moreover, NATO’s rejection of 
Italy’s calls, in June 2011, for a break in air raids to allow humanitarian assistance 
into cities and towns in Libya affected by fighting, also suggests that the 
protection of civilians was no longer the most important consideration for 
NATO.
89
 The statement by the United Kingdom’s Foreign Minister supports this 
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conclusion, for he asserted that the continuation of bombing was important in 
putting pressure on the Gaddafi regime and that ‘[Gaddafi] needs to go, and go 
now’, a sentiment echoed by France.90 Given that the defeat of the Gaddafi 
military was not the purpose of Resolution 1973 (2011), it is difficult to reconcile 
how concerns over military regrouping could overcome the need for humanitarian 
assistance unless the purpose of the NATO intervention had changed from one of 
humanitarian protection to one of regime change. As Ulfstein notes, NATO 
provided close air support to the rebels in their attacks on Gaddafi-held cities and 
towns; where areas were already under the control of Gaddafi and contained no 
rebel forces fighting against loyalist forces, it is hard to see how Gaddafi’s troops 
presented a threat to the civilian population within such cities.
91
 Instead, 
advancing rebels who intended to engage Gaddafi’s forces in fighting would 
logically be the threat to civilian populated areas, as their actions would turn an 
area not involved in fighting into a war zone.
92
  
While Haász suggests that the only way to protect civilians was to remove 
Gaddafi from power, it is clear from both the wording of Resolution 1973 (2011) 
and the preceding Security Council debate regarding the resolution that the 
removal of Gaddafi was not part of the Resolution’s mandate.93 In their 
statements, both China and Russia clarified that their choice to refrain from 
exercising their veto was made on the basis that the States proposing the 
intervention had emphasised that it would not become a large-scale military 
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intervention and would be for the sole purpose of protecting innocent civilians.
94
 
South Africa, which voted in favour of Resolution 1973 (2011), specifically stated 
that they hoped that States involved in the implementation of the Resolution 
would do so ‘in full respect for both its letter and spirit’,95 while Lebanon, which 
also voted in favour, stressed the importance of still working towards a ‘peaceful 
solution to the situation in Libya’, even if intervention was necessary.96 
Throughout the preceding Security Council debate, statements were made 
accentuating the importance of finding a peaceful resolution to the conflict and the 
need to restrain from the use of military force.
97
 It thus becomes evident that the 
mandate of Resolution 1973 (2011) could not be so widely interpreted as to 
include, within the protection of civilians, the removal of the Gaddafi regime.
98
 
This is because the latter would defeat any ability to come to a peaceful resolution 
and violate the principles of territorial and national integrity.
99
  
Repercussions of the Libyan Intervention 
The crisis in Libya was the first opportunity for the international community to 
show its commitment to the responsibility to protect and work within its 
framework for the authorisation of intervention on humanitarian grounds.
100
 With 
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two members of the Security Council having deliberately chosen to forego their 
veto power and allow the adoption of a Resolution authorising intervention for the 
protection of civilians from the threat of attack, the Council moved towards an 
active adoption of the responsibility to protect, with Thakur citing that it was ‘the 
first instance of the implementation of the sharp edge of the new norm of the 
responsibility to protect’.101 The inclusion in the preamble of Resolution 1973 
(2011) of a reference to the Libyan government’s responsibility to protect its 
citizens was seen by Hipold as a ‘pivotal step for the further affirmation of this 
principle’.102 Further, it was generally hailed by humanitarian interventionists103 
as a confirmation that the responsibility to protect had finally ‘arrived’.104 
However, while supporters of the intervention saw Libya as a textbook case for 
the implementation of the responsibility to protect, much of the international 
community was less enamoured with the intervention, instead seeing it as an 
example of how the responsibility to protect could be manipulated by more 
powerful States for other means. South Africa, a former supporter of the 
intervention, stated that the NATO intervention had ‘left a scar on the [African] 
continent … that will take many years to heal’ and that ‘developed countries with 
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their own national agendas hijacked a genuine democratic protest by the people of 
Libya, to further their regime change agendas’.105 In agreement, Kenya noted that 
the intervention in Libya was ‘at best worrisome, and at worst, deeply 
disconcerting’. Such statements have led to the fostering of doubts over whether 
the responsibility to protect could ever function without being abused.
106
 
NATO’s extension of the mission in Libya to aims which were not included in 
Resolution 1973 (2011) did much to reinforce concerns over the responsibility to 
protect legitimating interventions by larger States to accomplish their own 
objectives. It resulted in the permanent member States of Russia and China 
returning to utilising their veto power. Concerns regarding NATO’s intervention 
emanated not only from concerned States but also regional organisations; the 
President of the African Union condemned NATO’s continued use of force 
outside the remit of Resolution 1973 (2011)
107
 while the Community of Sahel-
Saharan States also denounced NATO’s refusal to participate in a cease-fire, 
instead continuing to cooperate with rebels who refused to entertain any form of 
negotiation without the removal of Gaddafi.
108
 Finally, even after the end of the 
NATO intervention, Mexico,
109
 Guatemala,
110
 Kenya,
111
 Cuba,
112
 New 
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Zealand,
113
 the Netherlands,
114
 Venezuela,
115
 and Pakistan
116
 all specifically 
addressed ‘what many consider the misapplication of Resolutions 1970 and 
1973’.117 Therefore, by the end of the NATO intervention, there was widespread 
concern that NATO had exceeded the Resolution 1973 (2011) mandate and 
deviated from the purely humanitarian objective of protecting citizens. Such 
comments also suggest that before any further use of the responsibility to protect 
was, or is, made, a more concrete framework should be created around the use of 
force.
118
 While the responsibility to protect was not rejected by States after the 
Libyan intervention, the ‘recent debates indicate growing scepticism towards 
accepting [the responsibility to protect] as an emerging norm … or as a workable 
framework for international decision making’.119 More damaging, however, was 
the effect the Libyan intervention would have on any further action by Security 
Council permanent members in relation to other crises. 
By March 2011, Syria felt the effects of the Arab Spring; national demonstrations 
against the undemocratic regime of President Bashar al-Assad
120
 began to form 
and were met by the government’s military forces.121 As had occurred at the onset 
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of the movement in Libya, initially peaceful groups of protesters were reported as 
armed.
122
 By September 2011, the conflict in Syria had reached similar 
proportions to that in Libya and the Commission of Inquiry on Syria found that 
the conflict ‘had reached the legal threshold for a non-international armed 
conflict’.123 The conflict in Syria was remarkably similar to that in Libya. Like 
Libya, protests which were initially peaceful began in response to the Arab Spring 
and targeted the Assad regime on the basis of human rights violations and its 
undemocratic nature
124
 and were quickly responded to with force by the 
government.
125
 Similar to Libya, groups protesting against the Assad regime 
became armed and the Syrian government claimed the violence used against such 
groups was legitimate as they represented terrorist factions within Syria.
126
 
Moreover, as in the crisis in Libya, both rebel forces and Syrian government 
forces have been believed to have taken part in acts which would constitute 
crimes against humanity, violations of humanitarian law and war crimes (an issue 
which remains active at the time of writing).
127
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By April 2011, all members of the Security Council expressed concern at the 
violence unfolding in Syria.
128
 Some States specifically noted the importance of 
respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Syria while supporting the 
resolution of conflicts within the State.
129
 Violence within Syria continued and the 
Security Council authorised its President to make a statement regarding the Syrian 
crisis which noted the concerns Security Council members had over the increased 
violence within the State, their wish for all sides to the conflict to end the violence 
being perpetrated, and the failure of the Syrian government to implement the 
reforms promised or to make efforts to alleviate the humanitarian crisis within the 
Syrian State.
130
 The same statement also referred to the importance of the conflict 
within Syria being solved through a peaceful process which was Syrian-led, and 
the Security Council’s commitment to ‘the sovereignty, independence and 
territorial integrity of Syria’.131 The repeated references to the importance of the 
territorial integrity of the Syrian State give an indication of the importance that 
members of the Council placed upon refraining from entering into a similar 
situation to that which was unfolding in Libya. As Zifcak notes, ‘reservations 
concerning the prospect of any intervention by the international community to 
address the Syrian crisis were being clearly expressed’.132  
By the time of the Presidential statement in August, NATO forces were actively 
cooperating with rebels and had moved from targeting purely military targets to 
infrastructure. Once the full extent of this NATO involvement had become 
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clearer, resistance to any form of intervention, whether military or not, became 
more pronounced. In October 2011 France, Germany, Portugal, and the United 
Kingdom tabled a resolution which addressed the continued violence committed 
by both rebels and government forces in Syria.
133
 The draft resolution did not 
include any reference to Chapter VII authorisation, instead ‘reaffirming its strong 
commitment to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and national 
unity of Syria’.134 However, the affirmation of the sovereignty of Syria was not 
included in the operative part of the resolution, while a clause was included which 
expressed the intention of the Security Council to review Syrian implementation 
of the resolution, with the possibility of considering powers under Article 41 of 
the Charter should such implementation be found lacking.
135
 The inclusion of the 
possibility of Chapter VII powers being used was taken by Russia to indicate a 
‘philosophy of confrontation’ and constituted ‘the threat of an ultimatum and 
sanctions against Syrian authorities’.136 Previously, Russia had made clear that, 
given NATO’s decision to exceed the Resolution 1973 (2011) mandate, any draft 
resolution worded in a manner that would allow another military intervention or 
would allow misinterpretation of such a resolution would be vetoed on the basis 
that ‘a good resolution ha[d] been turned into a piece of paper that [was] used to 
provide cover for a meaningless military operation’.137 Moreover, Russia, China, 
Brazil, Lebanon, and South Africa raised concerns over a definitive lack of 
condemnation of the Syrian rebels who had also been engaging in violence. 
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Whilst the draft resolution actively condemned the Syrian government’s 
participation in violence, there was no condemnation of any possible violence 
perpetrated by rebels, nor was there any expression of concern regarding reports 
that rebel forces were being populated by extremists.
138
 In Russia’s statement on 
the proposed resolution, the Libyan intervention was mentioned several times, 
specifically stating that part of the decision to veto the resolution was based on 
both a refusal to incorporate clauses relating to the unacceptability of any form of 
military intervention in the resolution and the fear that the resolution would be 
used by States to act as they had in the case of Libya. Therefore, in the eyes of 
Russia, ‘the situation in Syria cannot be considered in the Council separately from 
the Libyan experience’.139 China similarly expressed its concern that the draft 
resolution acted more as a threat than a tool to implement a peaceful conclusion to 
the conflict in Syria.
140
 South Africa averred that the resolution was merely a 
‘prelude to further action’ and thus they were concerned that the resolution was 
‘part of a hidden agenda aimed at once again instituting regime change’.141 Due to 
the major concerns voiced by China, Russia, Lebanon, India, South Africa, and 
Brazil regarding the possible misuse of the draft resolution and the general 
confrontational manner in which it was phrased, both China and Russia exercised 
their veto power.
142
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Russia and China’s reluctance to stay their veto power when voting for a 
resolution in relation to the Syrian crisis did not diminish, though international 
concern regarding violence grew. In November 2011 a Human Rights Council-
established, independent, international Commission of Inquiry found that serious 
violations of human rights had been committed by the Syrian government and that 
there was possible evidence of crimes against humanity.
143
 In response to a 
resolution adopted by the Human Rights Council,
144
 the Security Council again 
attempted to come to an agreement on the adoption of a resolution which 
responded to the crisis in Syria.
145
 In late January 2012, the Arab League 
proposed a draft resolution to the Security Council, having already implemented 
sanctions upon Syria with little effect.
146
 The draft resolution proposed that: Assad 
relinquish power to the Vice-President; the Syrian government immediately end 
all attacks and human rights violations against Syrians; all parties to violence 
immediately refrain from using violence; and that, if the measures not 
implemented within 15 days, the Security Council would consider further 
measures.
147
 Russia and China did not accept the proposed Arab League plan, 
mainly due to its intention to remove Assad from power and the inclusion of an 
ability to consider military intervention at a later point. In response, Morocco and 
18 other States proposed a draft resolution which proposed less controversial 
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terms.
148
 The draft resolution merely supported the Arab League’s plan, while an 
express term was included in the preamble which specified that the resolution was 
not authorising action under Article 42 of the Charter.
149
 While the draft 
resolution was almost wholly supported, both China and Russia did not accept the 
terms and exercised their power of veto.
150
 Again, the concerns of both Russia and 
China related to proposed regime change and the inclusion of a possibility for 
further action, with no clear concept of what such action would be.
151
 Reactions 
from the 13 proposing member States were acrimonious – the overall feeling of 
the Security Council was that the Russian and Chinese veto was directly against 
the purpose of the Council and therefore implicitly supported the Syrian regime in 
its killing of civilians.
152
  
Certain members of the Security Council, such as the United States and France, 
suggested that Russia and China’s veto decisions were based purely on politics, 
not on the fears they voiced regarding intervention, terming these 
‘disingenuous’.153 The proposition that Russia and China were acting only in self-
interest does not, however, align with their affirmative votes to adopt two 
resolutions
154
 which supported and called for the implementation of the Six-Point 
Proposal of the Joint Special Envoy of the United Nations and the League of Arab 
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States.
155
 Russia and China’s willingness not only to refrain from using their veto 
power but also to vote in favour of a resolution which both condemned the 
violence committed by Assad’s regime (as well as rebel forces) and promoted a 
plan for a Syrian-led resolution resulting in Assad stepping down, suggests that 
their reticence to allow the adoption of other resolutions was not based solely on a 
pre-existing relationship with the Assad government.
156
 Instead, what is indicated 
is that there still existed a tangible fear that any resolution which authorises, or 
infers possible future authorisation of, Chapter VII action may be abused. This 
was a reality that had been evidenced in the invasion of Northern Iraq and the 
Libyan intervention. This is supported by the fact that, although Russia, China, 
Pakistan, and South Africa all showed support for the Six-Point Proposal in 
Resolutions 2042 (2012) and 2043 (2012), the support was not reiterated when 
Germany, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United States proposed a draft 
resolution in July 2012. This draft resolution advocated the authorisation of 
Chapter VII actions, as well as a decision that, were Syrian authorities not to have 
complied fully with the resolution within ten days, measures under Article 41 
would be taken.
157
 As Pakistan noted, in the subsequent Security Council debate, 
the international community had come to a consensus over the Six-Point Proposal 
but this was ‘undermined by the divergence of views on how to move forward … 
[which] could have been avoided had the divisive issues of Chapter VII and 
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coercive measures been set aside’.158 Yet again, both Russia and China declared 
that they were unwilling to accept a resolution involving Chapter VII measures 
which would ostensibly ‘open the way for … external military involvement’.159  
The crisis in Syria has become more acute at the time of writing; on 21
st
 August 
2013 an attack on a civilian area in Damascus showed signs that it could have 
been a chemical weapon attack using nerve agents.
160
 In response, the United 
Nations ordered a Mission already within Syria to investigate whether a chemical 
attack had taken place; the Mission was not, however, mandated to determine the 
source of the attack, only whether or not an attack had occurred.
161
 While the 
Mission did find that sarin gas had been used in a chemical attack, it also noted 
that it made no finding on who participated in the attack and that there was a 
prospect that evidence had been ‘moved and possibly manipulated’.162 However, 
before the results of the Mission’s investigation could be compiled, the United 
Kingdom, the United States, and France argued that an intervention must take 
place immediately.
163
 The threat of intervention by the three Western powers was 
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not well received by either Russia or China.
164
 Russia responded with a vow to 
help the Syrian State against any illegal intervention by foreign States.
165
 Russia 
and China’s concerns are not unfounded; the United States had already suggested 
that it would give support to Syrian rebels through training and personnel if an 
intervention were to take place.
166
 Indeed, the Central Intelligence Agency has 
acknowledged training small groups of Syrian rebels in Jordan.
167
 Though Russia 
has negotiated a plan for the destruction of all chemical weapons by 2014 with 
Syria, at the time of writing there has not been a Security Council resolution 
implementing Chapter VII measures, nor any definitive indication of what would 
occur if the Assad regime failed to adhere to the negotiated plan.
168
  
Conclusion 
As shown through unfolding events in Syria, the Libyan intervention had serious 
repercussions on the international community’s willingness to engage in the 
responsibility to protect.
169
 Fears over the ease with which humanitarian 
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objectives could be abused were magnified and States traditionally against foreign 
intervention became more so.
170
 The Libyan intervention also failed to bring to an 
end the violence within the region; though Gaddafi had been removed, the rebels 
themselves posed a threat to the civilian population. The rebel forces prior to 
Gaddafi’s removal had a unifying goal – ending Gaddafi’s regime.171 Under the 
umbrella of the National Transitional Council, there were between 100 and 300 
different militias, all with different command structures and beliefs as to how 
Libya should be governed.
172
 Even with Gaddafi removed from power, human 
rights violations, war crimes and crimes against humanity continued to be 
committed;
173
 as Shupak notes, ‘the mere fact of opposing a tyrant does not 
indicate that a given rebel group values human rights’.174 This was demonstrated 
with the mass killing of Gaddafi loyalists at the Mahari Hotel
175
 and the abduction 
of Africans suspected to have been Gaddafi’s mercenaries.176 Furthermore, the 
prevalence of factional fighting and a lack of post-conflict rebuilding has allowed 
extremist organisations to take hold of some of the militias, using the post-conflict 
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State as a cover for violence.
177
 Looting, bombing, random shooting in civilian 
areas, and clashes between fighters have resulted in a fear that Libya will descend 
again into civil war;
178
 as such, it is understandable why States like Russia, China, 
and Pakistan are concerned that intervention in Syria will only result in further 
violence.
179
  
However, arguably the worst damage that the Libyan intervention has inflicted 
was the consequential fear that Security Council-authorised intervention could be 
abused again. In abstaining from their veto power, both Russia and China stated 
they had chosen not to veto the resolution on the basis that they had been 
promised that the actions taken would not result in a large-scale intervention and 
would relate only to the protection of civilians.
180
 The subsequent NATO 
mission’s decision to exceed the Resolution 1973 (2011) mandate justifiably 
caused both permanent members to fear that resolutions allowing future 
interventions might also be manipulated in a similar manner.
181
 While Libya may 
have been the first formal foreign intervention in a State following the 2005 
World Summit’s adoption of the responsibility to protect, it failed to exhibit any 
of the characteristics of the responsibility to protect, lacking clear operational 
principles, proportionality, and well-defined humanitarian goals. It is for these 
reasons that the responsibility to protect has failed to become established as an 
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international norm, for, as Denisov notes, ‘the establishment of an international 
norm presupposes that there is wide support within the international community 
for such a norm … [T]hat is not the case here’.182 
                                                 
182
 UNGA Verbatim Record (7 April 2005) UN Doc A/59/PV.87. 
140 
 
      Chapter Seven: Conclusion 
Conclusion 
Humanitarian crises such as those in Rwanda, Bosnia, Kosovo, Libya and now 
Syria cause the international community serious concern. Not only are the deaths 
in such situations tragic, but the effects of violence within a State are often far 
reaching, including beyond the State’s own borders.1 Preventing the recurrence of 
such crises is not, however, simply a decision of either doing nothing or 
embarking upon a humanitarian intervention, as Tesón argues.
2
 The 
implementation of a humanitarian intervention principle in international law lacks 
legal foundation and is open to abuse making it an inappropriate remedy.
3
 Nor is 
the development of a humanitarian intervention norm which does rely on Security 
Council authorisation, but fails to work within any form of predictable 
framework, an appropriate remedy, as it too has the same opportunities for abuse 
to arise, as was seen in Chapter Six, with regard to Libya.
4
 
Humanitarian intervention relies upon the creation of an exception to the 
peremptory norm of Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter. However, the 
creation of the prohibition on the threat or use of force was guided by a desire to 
ensure the maintenance of the ‘territorial integrity or political independence of any 
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State’5 and to ‘guarantee for small States … the impermissible character of 
recourses to force against a State’.6 Arguments by humanitarian interventionists, 
such as Tesón and D’Amato, that Article 2(4) does not prohibit the use of force in 
humanitarian interventions are directly contradicted by declarations made by 
States during debates which took place during the United Nations Conference on 
International Organization.
7
 During the conference, the United States ‘made it 
clear that the intention of the authors of the original text was to state in the 
broadest terms an absolute all-inclusive prohibition’.8 This confirmed statements 
already made by Bolivia in relation to the inclusion of the phrase ‘against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of any State’, which was designed to 
strengthen the existing prohibition on the use of force.
9
 It was for this reason that 
only three very clear exceptions were created to the Article 2(4) prohibition: 
Chapter VII authorised intervention; individual or collective self-defence under 
Article 51; and consent. 
The creation of a vague exception to Article 2(4) on the basis of humanitarian 
intervention – with no clear framework as to its implementation – weakens the 
construct of the prohibition on the use of force and allows States the opportunity 
to abuse the exception. The failure of humanitarian intervention to rely on any 
form of Security Council authorisation permits States to intervene without any 
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oversight as to the purpose of the intervention or the intended use of force. Such 
lack of oversight means that the chance for more powerful States to ‘manipulate 
humanitarian concerns and attempt to use the doctrine as a weapon against weaker 
States’ is greater.10 To suggest that there is a moral necessity to use humanitarian 
interventions to end the suffering of innocent civilians, but that no such moral 
necessity exists where humanitarian interventions can themselves be abused, is a 
non sequitur. As was seen in Chapter Four, regardless of academic calls (such as 
those by Tesón and Eckert) for the creation of a humanitarian intervention norm, 
the international community has continued, throughout the twentieth century as 
well as more recently, to reject the principle of a norm of humanitarian 
intervention.
11
 Indeed, even in the case of Kosovo, which was the strongest 
example of a possible humanitarian intervention, the international community 
continued to deny that any international norm of humanitarian intervention had 
been developed.
12
 Rather, it reiterated the importance of the principle of non-
intervention. Even participating States in the Kosovo intervention, such as the 
United States and Germany, argued that no humanitarian intervention principle 
had been developed, and that instead Kosovo presented an exceptional and unique 
set of circumstances that provided no precedent for further interventions.
13
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Nevertheless, following the Kosovo intervention, the UN Secretary-General, Kofi 
Annan, noted that while non-intervention was a basic tenet of international law, 
the international community could not continue to be idle in the face of such 
terrible circumstances.
14
 It was in response to this point that the International 
Commission on State Sovereignty developed the responsibility to protect doctrine 
in its 2001 Report. As detailed in Chapter Five, the responsibility to protect 
provided the necessary framework for interventions of a humanitarian nature to be 
carried out under Security Council Chapter VII authorisation; this framework 
limited the possibility of abuse and allowed the international community to react 
to humanitarian crises without the concern of eroding the principle of non-
intervention. However, in adopting the responsibility to protect at the 2005 World 
Summit, the framework necessary to limit potential abuse was stripped from the 
doctrine. As a result, that which had been intended to create a workable 
framework for interventions of a humanitarian nature was reduced to only a vague 
reiteration of pre-existing responsibilities under international law. Even after its 
adoption by the General Assembly the doctrine saw little use, resulting in no 
ability for a norm to be developed. 
However, the most damaging effect on the responsibility to protect doctrine was 
NATO’s exceeding of the Resolution 1973 (2011) mandate in the intervention in 
Libya.
15
 Responding to events in Libya, in 2011the Security Council noted for the 
first time the responsibility to protect in its authorisation of the use of ‘all 
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necessary measures’ to protect civilians under Chapter VII.16 Had the original 
responsibility to protect framework (that proposed in 2001) been used, the 
intervention may have remained focussed on the protection of civilians. However, 
as Chapter Six considered, the NATO intervention in Libya went far beyond the 
original Resolution 1973 (2011) mandate; NATO cooperated with and aided the 
rebels, and was directly involved in the removal of Gaddafi. NATO collaboration 
went so far as use force against Gaddafi troops even where no threat to civilians 
existed; this included the provision of air support to rebels both before and during 
attacks on cities held by Gaddafi forces. The abstention of China and Russia from 
using their veto power in the vote to adopt Resolution 1973 (2011) had been a 
move towards greater Security Council efficacy; it saw two States traditionally 
opposed to intervention deciding not to use their veto in order to allow the 
protection of civilians. The resultant abuse of Resolution 1973 (2011) negated the 
growing confidence that Russia and China
17
 had exhibited in the responsibility to 
protect doctrine. This can be seen in their absolute refusal to allow the adoption of 
any resolution regarding Syria that mentions the possibility of Chapter VII use, as 
was also noted in Chapter Six. Indeed, Russia has specifically cited the Libyan 
intervention as their reason for refusing to allow the adoption of any resolution 
which mentions possible recourse to Chapter VII,
18
 while other nations, such as 
South Africa, have expressed concerns that such resolutions were a ‘prelude to 
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further action’ and ‘part of a hidden agenda aimed at once again instituting regime 
change’.19 
The purpose of this thesis was to determine whether any form of norm has 
developed in international law in relation to interventions on humanitarian bases, 
either in the form of humanitarian intervention or the responsibility to protect. 
What has been shown, through the analysis of the development of the customary 
international principle of non-intervention, the theory of humanitarian 
intervention, and subsequent State practice in relation to interventions based on 
humanitarian grounds, is that no norm of humanitarian intervention has 
developed. Furthermore, the thesis has established that, since the intervention in 
Libya in 2011, and in the diluted form adopted by the General Assembly in 2005, 
the responsibility to protect has been ineffectual in ensuring Security Council 
authorised humanitarian interventions are not abused. Finally, it has been shown 
that the Libyan intervention itself has served to solidify concerns regarding 
interventions based on a humanitarian basis and resulted in States, such as Russia, 
China, and India, returning to a position of being reluctant to allow the use of 
force for claimed humanitarian goals. 
From these observations, therefore, it can be advanced that it is unlikely that any 
norm will develop in the near future, unless the international community adopts 
the responsibility to protect in its full form. Given the debates during the 2005 
World Summit, and events thereafter, such a prospect seems unlikely. Larger 
States such as the United States and United Kingdom will continue to resist any 
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framework which restricts their military capabilities in such interventions to 
purely humanitarian goals while States such as Pakistan and Russia will continue 
to view any acceptance of an international responsibility to intervene in the 
domestic affairs of other States as contrary to Charter provisions. In light of 
current reactions to the Syrian crisis, it is likely that there will be continued 
attempts to use the responsibility to protect to implement democratic change, 
though such a use of the doctrine goes against its own principles, which will be 
combatted by continued attempts to block such intervention through the use, or 
threat of use, of veto power. Therefore, the failure to develop any norm on the 
basis of humanitarian grounds will result in continuing challenges in ensuring that 
massacres, such as that in Rwanda, do not occur again.  
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